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TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE 
EDWARD LEE* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article proposes a framework tailoring the fair use doctrine 
specifically for technology cases. At the inception of the twenty-first 
century, information technologies have become increasingly central to the 
U.S. economy. Not surprisingly, complex copyright cases involving speech 
technologies, such as DVRs, MP3 devices, Google Book Search, and 
YouTube, have also increased. Yet existing copyright law, developed long 
before digital technologies, is ill prepared to handle the complexities that 
these technology cases pose. The key question often turns not on prima 
facie infringement, but on the defense of fair use, which courts have too 
often relegated to extremely fact-specific decisions. The downside to this ad 
hoc adjudication of fair use is that it leads to an uncertainty over what is 
permissible that may impede innovation in speech technologies. This 
Article addresses this ongoing problem by proposing that courts recognize 
a specific type of fair use—technological fair use—and tailor the four fair 
use factors accordingly. Technological fair use is supported not only by a 
synthesis of existing case law and economic theory, but also, more 
importantly, by the constitutional underpinnings of the First Amendment 
and the Copyright and Patent Clause. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In our Information Age, a new form of fair use is emerging. It 
involves not just individual uses of copyrighted works, but also the 
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development of new speech technologies.1 Cases involving these 
“technological fair uses”2 are often far more complex and significant to the 
U.S. economy than traditional fair use cases. At stake is not just the legality 
of certain uses of copyrighted works, but also, quite often, the legality of 
new technologies that can have a profound impact on innovation and the 
growth of the U.S. economy, as well as on people’s daily lives. 
Consider Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
perhaps the mother of technological fair use.3 At stake in Sony was the 
legality of not only the new consumer practice of taping television shows at 
home for later viewing (known as “time-shifting”), but also the sale of an 
entire line of the then-new technology known as the VCR.4 Several movie 
studios sought to ban VCRs so they could market their own approved 
videodisc player that did not offer consumers the ability to record television 
broadcasts.5 Ultimately, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,6 held that 
 
 1. By “speech technology,” I mean any technology that functions in creating, displaying, or 
disseminating speech. How far to apply this definition may present some difficult questions, at least on 
the margins. Without running through the myriad possibilities, I believe all of the key copyright cases 
discussed in this Article fall within the definition of speech technology in a way that most people will 
find uncontroversial. For those cases that are more difficult, social norms may help shape what is 
viewed as a technology. For example, the technology may have become so commonplace—e.g., printed 
books and picture frames—that people no longer view it as a technology. Yet the technology may later 
become more advanced—e.g., digital books and digital frames—so that it becomes viewed again as a 
technology. For simplicity, I do not at this time include technologies, such as digital rights management, 
that function to stop the creation, display, or dissemination of speech within my definition. Although 
such antispeech dissemination technologies are related to speech, they have not yet raised cases 
involving the assertion of fair use as justifications for the creation of those technologies.  
 2. “Technological fair use” is a term that I have coined to describe a subset of fair use cases 
dealing with technologies. Courts have yet formally to adopt this terminology, although a synthesis of 
the fair use cases in this area supports my approach.  
 3. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 4. Id. at 420–21. The Court described Sony’s Betamax as a “video tape recorder,” or “VTR.” Id. 
at 420. This type of machine eventually became commonly known as the “VCR,” or “video cassette 
recorder.” 
 5. Id. at 421–22. Music Corporation of America, which owned Universal Studios and had 
developed the competing videodisc player that did not have recording capability, orchestrated the 
lawsuit to stop the Sony Betamax by having Universal file the lawsuit, with Disney joining the suit as a 
coplaintiff against Sony. See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE 
ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 26–30, 119, 316–28 (1987); WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE 
COPYRIGHT WARS 149–50 (2009); Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 401 & 
n.522 (2008) [hereinafter Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0]. 
 6. Initially, a majority of the Court took the opposite view (against Sony) in its conference 
following oral argument. For fascinating accounts of the Court’s internal shift in Sony, see Jessica 
Litman, The Story of Sony v. Universal Studios: Mary Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 358, 366–82 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 
2006). See also Jonathan Band & Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind the 
Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427 (1993) (tracing the 
development of the Sony case through the use of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s public papers). 
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home time-shift recordings were a permissible fair use and that the VCR 
was perfectly legal because the technology was capable of “substantial 
noninfringing uses.”7  
Had the Court decided the other way and upheld a ban on VCRs, the 
world today would be vastly different. The fifteen years following the Sony 
decision saw sales of VCRs in the millions, with 88.6 percent of all U.S. 
households owning a VCR by 1999.8 Indeed, the growth rate in sales of 
VCRs eclipsed the past rate of market penetration of color televisions.9 
Hollywood’s preferred technology over the VCR, the (nonrecording) 
laserdisc, flopped.10 But the sale of VCRs in turn facilitated the growth of a 
vast new and unforeseen market for the movie studios in the rental and sale 
of videos for home viewing, which, perhaps ironically,11 became “the 
largest source of revenue for the [U.S.] movie industry,” even surpassing 
box office sales.12 In fact, the major Hollywood studios benefited the most 
from the burgeoning home video market.13 Today, videos on DVD, the 
successor to the VCR home market, “generate[] more than double the 
revenues collected at the box office.”14 The VCR also facilitated a new 
 
 7. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
 8. 81.2% of US Households Have DVD Players, 79.2%—VCR Machines, IT FACTS, Dec. 20, 
2006, http://www.itfacts.biz/812-of-us-households-have-dvd-players-792-vcr-machines/7871 (citing 
NIELSEN MEDIA RESEARCH, 3RD QUARTER HOME TECHNOLOGY REPORT (2006)). During the eight 
years that it took to resolve Sony (1976–1984), the number of VCRs in U.S. households rose 
exponentially, from 475,000 to 5 million. Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
433, 439 (2008). Most of the VCRs were made by foreign manufacturers. 1990 U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 47-5 [hereinafter 1990 OUTLOOK]. 
 9. See ELEC. MARKET DATA BOOK 16–17 (Elec. Indus. Ass’n 1990) [hereinafter 1990 DATA 
BOOK]. 
 10. See ELEC. MARKET DATA BOOK 21 tbl.2.2 (Elec. Indus. Ass’n 1993) (stating that in 1992 
sales of VCRs exceeded 12 million, while sales of laserdiscs were only 212,000, or just 1.8 percent of 
VCR sales). 
 11. The VCR’s huge financial boon to the movie industry made laughable the dire predictions of 
Motion Picture Association of America president Jack Valenti, who testified before Congress about the 
dangers that these recorders posed to the motion picture industry, warning that “the VCR is to the 
American film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.” 
Litman, supra note 6, at 365. See also PATRY, supra note 5, at 144–54 (describing Valenti’s testimony 
that the VCR would threaten both the motion picture industry and the American public). 
 12. Edward Lee, The Ethics of Innovation: p2p Software Developers and Designing Substantial 
Noninfringing Uses Under the Sony Doctrine, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 147, 148 (2005). In 1988, just five 
years after Sony, video rentals and sales totaled $11.3 billion in the United States, a 51 percent increase 
from 1987. See 1990 OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 47-5. 
 13. See 1990 OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 47-6 (“52 percent of all industry sales were garnered by 
the top five U.S. suppliers; some independents and smaller distributors went out of business, while 
others were beset by increasing difficulties.”). 
 14. Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 840–41 
(2008). 
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market for camcorders and video cameras; sales for these products doubled 
within a decade.15 Thus, had Sony been decided the other way, literally 
billions of dollars in revenue in these three new markets (VCRs, video 
rentals/sales, and video cameras) might never have materialized—
consumer spending on rentals and sales of videotapes and DVDs alone 
totaled a staggering $343.2 billion between 1981 and 2006.16 As this single 
example suggests, technological fair use cases may be far weightier than 
other fair use cases, at least in terms of dollar amounts and their effect on 
the U.S. economy.17  
The question of technological fair use is not merely a relic of the past. 
Although VCRs are headed toward obsolescence, technological fair use is a 
doctrine relevant to some of the most innovative speech technologies in 
recent years, such as Google’s Book Search and Amazon’s Kindle. Both 
technologies offer great benefits to the public. For example, Google’s Book 
Search, an online search tool, enables people to search within the texts of 
 
 15. See 1990 OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 45-7. From 1992 to 2001, camcorders doubled in sales 
to more than 5 million. See ELEC. MARKET DATA BOOK 16 (Elec. Indus. Ass’n 2002) (citing eBrain 
Market Research). The VCR facilitated the camcorder market because “[c]amcorders [were] purchased 
primarily by consumers who already own[ed] home VCR decks and [we]re interested in a simple to use, 
lightweight portable for electronic photography.” 1990 DATA BOOK, supra note 9, at 17. 
 16. Entertainment Merchant Association, Consumer Spending—Rental & Sell-Through: VHS & 
DVD Combined 1981–2006, http://www.entmerch.org/adams_research.html (last visited May 1, 2010) 
(citing Adams Media Research). See also 2000 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE U.S.: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK 566 tbl.909 (reporting data on consumer spending on home 
video from 1993 to 2003); 1995 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: THE 
NATIONAL DATA BOOK 572 tbl.899 (reporting data from 1985 to 1993). 
 17. Apple’s iPod provides another example of a type of speech technology that has generated 
considerable revenues supported by fair use—the device produced over $13 billion in revenue in its first 
five years. Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 838. Along with the popular iTunes music download 
service, the iPod has helped to facilitate the growth of the market for digital downloads. By January 
2009, Apple had sold 6 billion songs, selling roughly 2 billion songs per year. Paul Resnikoff, What 
Else? iTunes Store Hits 6 Billion . . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS, Dec. 29, 2009, 
http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/stories/010609what. This figure does not include the growing 
download video market. My sense is that most people think that transferring one’s purchased music 
from CDs onto an iPod would constitute fair use, and most copyright commentators would likely also 
agree. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 837 (explaining how “there would be no iPod if Apple 
could not count on copyright law to permit iPod buyers to copy their existing CD collections”). See also 
Lawrence Lessig, A Rotten Ruling, WIRED, Sept. 2005, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.09/ 
posts.html?pg=7 (explaining that Apple knew when developing and promoting the iPod that people 
would copy music from CDs). Yet the Recording Industry Association of America has not embraced 
that view, instead characterizing such transfers as simply permitted by the music industry. Ass’n of Am. 
Publishers et al., RM 2005-11, Joint Reply Comments 22 n.46 (Feb. 2, 2006), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/11metalitz_AAP.pdf (presenting comments following 
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control 
Technologies, Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,526 (Oct. 3, 2005), arguing that routine permission to 
make a copy does not “necessarily establish that the copying is a fair use when the copyright owner 
withholds that authorization”). 
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the many millions of books scanned by Google and participating libraries.18 
Also, Amazon’s Kindle, an e-book reader, has a “text-to-speech” capability 
that allows automated voice narration of electronic books,19 a function that 
is especially useful for the blind, visually impaired, and those with learning 
disabilities.20 While both of these technologies have the capability of 
providing benefits to the public, their claims of fair use remain uncertain 
and unresolved. Other emerging speech technologies are likely to face the 
same problem.  
Despite the importance of fair use involving technologies, our 
understanding of technological fair use is thin. Courts have not formally 
recognized the concept of “technological fair use,” even though several 
important fair use cases have involved a similar type of intersection 
between a fair use and the development of a technology.21 The case law 
remains, as it does generally for fair use, ad hoc.22 Moreover, none of the 
purposes or factors in the fair use provision in the Copyright Act 
specifically addresses how the development of a new speech technology 
should be considered, if at all, in the fair use analysis.23 Although Congress 
recognized the likelihood that “rapid technological change” would affect 
fair use when it enacted the Copyright Act in 1976, it did not want “to 
freeze the doctrine in the statute.”24 Instead, Congress thought it better to 
leave fair use to case-by-case development.25 
 
 18. See Google Books, About Google Books, Overview, http://books.google.com/intl/en/ 
googlebooks/about.html (last visited May 2, 2010). 
 19. See Posting of Brad Stone to N.Y. Times Bits, (Feb. 27, 2009, 18:51 EST), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/amazon-backs-off-text-to-speech-feature-in-kindle/. Text-to-
speech functionality is not limited to e-book readers. For example, both Adobe and Apple have text-to-
speech software capability for text documents and, in the case of Apple, even for HTML documents and 
Web pages. See Adobe, Section Two: Using the Read out Loud Text-to-Speech Tool, 
http://www.adobe.com/enterprise/accessibility/reader6/sec2.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2010); Apple, 
iSpeak It 3.5.1, http://www.apple.com/downloads/macosx/ipod_itunes/ispeakit.html (last visited May 1, 
2010).  
 20  See Danny O’Brien, Disabled Must Be Given Equal Digital Rights, IRISH TIMES, May 22, 
2009, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2009/0522/1224247099810.html. See 
also Reading Rights Coalition Denounces Random House, READING RIGHTS COAL., May 20, 2009, 
http://www.readingrights.org/453.  
 21. See infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.  
 22. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is not to be 
simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case 
analysis.” (citations omitted)). 
 23. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (outlining the fair use provision). 
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5680 (“The bill 
endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to 
freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change.”). 
 25. See id. (“Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the 
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Congress’s decision to grant courts the authority to develop the 
doctrine through common law adjudication was sensible at the time. More 
than thirty years later, however, courts appear to have misunderstood this 
broad authority to fashion and further develop the fair use doctrine as a 
straitjacket that permits only very fact-specific decisions applying, almost 
by rote, the four statutory fair use factors.26 Over the past thirty years, 
courts have provided greater ex ante guidance to the public on what 
specifically constitutes fair use in only three different types of fair use 
situations—time-shift recordings of television shows in the home,27 reverse 
engineering to achieve interoperability,28 and parody fair uses.29 Although 
one or two more might be added to the list of specific types of fair use that 
operate in more rule-like fashion,30 the overall number of fair use cases that 
provide even a modicum of certainty to the public with regard to future 
conduct is miniscule. This uncertainty may lead unwittingly to a 
“permission culture,” in which requesting permission is expected, 
regardless of whether or not it is necessary, for every use.31 
The lack of fair use guidance is especially troubling for the 
development of information technology in the United States. The uncertain 
prospect of fair use makes it difficult for technology companies and venture 
capitalists to make investments, as companies and venture capitalists may 
decide against investing in developing new technologies that run the risk of 
a copyright lawsuit, notwithstanding the merits of any potential fair use 
defense. Further, in some cases, overt threats of a lawsuit by copyright 
industries may chill the adoption or marketing of a new technological 
function.  
Google’s proposed settlement32 of the multimillion dollar class action 
 
criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-
by-case basis.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 26. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (calling for case-by-case adjudication of fair use). 
 27. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 28. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 29. See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. 
 30. For example, quoting a work is commonly recognized as a fair use. There is often much 
dispute over how many words can be quoted without permission, however, which may lead to 
publishers requiring permission for all quotes of other sources within a book. See Timothy Hill, Entropy 
and Atrophy: The Still Uncertain Status of the Fair Use of Unpublished Works and the Implications for 
Scholarly Criticism, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 79, 94–96 (2003). Likewise, fair use copying to 
make a lexicon is now a recognized type of fair use, but the question of how much copying is 
permissible seems less clear ex ante. See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 
549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that the “amount and substantiality of the portion copied from 
the . . . books weighs more heavily against a finding of fair use”).  
 31. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 192–93 (2004). 
 32. See Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136-
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copyright lawsuit, filed by the Authors Guild and the Association of 
American Publishers against Google Book Search, provides an ominous 
warning: even one of the leading and largest tech companies in the world, 
with vast resources at its disposal, is unwilling to test the fair use defense 
for a new technology that offers much social benefit. The same can be said 
for tech giant Amazon, as it agreed to deactivate its “text-to-speech” 
function on Kindle for all books unless a copyright holder grants 
permission for a particular work on a title-by-title basis.33 If Amazon and 
Google, both Fortune 500 companies, stand down from defending fair use 
in court, can other tech companies with fewer resources be expected to 
stand up and defend a fair use claim?  
Although fair use has been analyzed in nearly four hundred law 
review articles in the United States,34 figuring out how best to tailor the fair 
use factors specifically for technologies has remained elusive.35 In the 
1980s, a few articles offered specific proposals on how to tailor fair use for 
technologies.36 Unfortunately, the proposals did not appear to have any 
influence on subsequent court decisions on fair use. Today, with incredible 
advances in information technology along with the Internet, the issue is 
very much ripe for review. Two of the most influential copyright scholars, 
Paul Goldstein and Pamela Samuelson, have both broached the topic, as 
have other scholars.37 Although neither described this category as 
 
DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/ 
view_settlement_agreement [hereinafter Amended GBS Settlement]. The Amended GBS Settlement 
was the result of revisions to the original proposed agreement that drew considerable objections from 
many entities. See Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, Google and Partners Revise Terms of Digital Book 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009. See also Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 
No. 05 CV 8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/ 
r/view_settlement_agreement [hereinafter Original GBS Settlement]. 
 33. Posting of Brad Stone, supra note 19. 
 34. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 433 (“Fair use is a uniquely American doctrine, and no fewer than 
389 articles in American law reviews have squared off with the defense since the doctrine’s first 
appearance under that name.”). 
 35. Of course, scholars have long recognized that copyright law is constantly challenged, if not 
driven, by new technologies. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO 
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 29 (rev. ed. 2003). 
 36. See Adrienne J. Marsh, Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropriate Standards to Apply, 
5 CARDOZO L. REV. 635 (1984); Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic as 
Well as the Gutenberg Age, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 193 (1980); Note, Toward a Unified Theory of 
Copyright Infringement for an Advanced Technological Era, 96 HARV. L. REV. 450 (1982) [hereinafter 
Unified Theory]. 
 37. See Goldstein, supra note 8; Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other 
Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 49 (1993); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009) 
[hereinafter Samuelson, Unbundling]. For other scholarship suggesting changes to fair use or its 
DO NOT DELETE 8/9/2010 9:41:24 AM 
804 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:797 
 
“technological fair use,” both scholars recognized a central premise that 
forms the basis for my research here—that is, that a distinctive category of 
fair use exists based on the presence of a technology related to the 
contemplated fair use.38  
This Article explores the theories and contours of technological fair 
use. Part II introduces the concept of technological fair use and provides a 
brief discussion of the relevant case law involving fair use and 
technologies. Part III develops a theory of technological fair use based on 
the constitutional values undergirding both the First Amendment and the 
Copyright and Patent Clause, as well as economic theory. This part 
explains why, as a normative matter, the courts and Congress should afford 
breathing room for technological fair use by providing more clearly defined 
guidance on what is and is not permissible. Part IV proposes a framework 
for technological cases by tailoring the four statutory factors of fair use 
specifically for these types of cases. Although my proposed framework 
does not yield formulaic certainty to decide all technological fair use cases 
(no test of fair use can), it provides guidance for courts and the public on 
 
adjudication in light of technologies, see Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital 
Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1410–25 (2004) 
(proposing, among other things, the use of a dispute resolution system to handle digital copyright 
infringement, with a defense built in for arguable fair use); Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571 (2008) (suggesting applying only the first and fourth fair use factors to new 
digital technology cases); and Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the 
Digital Age, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1055 (2007) (proposing fair use analysis to “ask how society can 
best promote progress in the advancement of knowledge—through its production and access—in a 
digital age that brings universal search capability within the reach of everyone with a computer and an 
Internet connection”). 
 38. See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 438–39 (recognizing “the category of cases that tests the 
liability of . . . new technologies for the distribution of copyrighted content”); Samuelson, Unbundling, 
supra note 37, at 2602 (“One of the important functions of fair use is providing a balancing mechanism 
within copyright law to allow it to address questions posed by new technologies or other developments 
that the legislature could not or did not contemplate.” (footnote omitted)). Beyond the articles already 
cited, only a few others have directly examined aspects of changing or tailoring fair use or comparable 
copyright exemption in order to help promote technologies. See Kevin M. Lemley, The Innovative 
Medium Defense: A Doctrine to Promote the Multiple Goals of Copyright in the Wake of Advancing 
Digital Technologies, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 111 (2005) (advocating that an appropriate balance in 
copyright law should be struck to ensure that innovation is not stifled while at the same time allowing 
copyright owners to receive sufficient return on their investments); Robin A. Moore, Note, Fair Use 
and Innovation Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 944 (2007) (analyzing the economic effect that fair use has 
on the incentive to invest and create technologies affecting copyrighted works and suggesting the use of 
an “incremental innovation framework” in the copyright context to maximally encourage technological 
advances); Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 843 (recognizing the importance of fair use in promoting 
technological innovation for “complementary goods to copyrighted works”). While this article was in 
the final editing stage of production, Matthew Sag published a thoughtful piece, Matthew Sag, 
Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607 (2009), which argues for the 
recognition of a principle of nonexpressive use for fair uses related to technologies.  
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how these cases should be analyzed. One of the keys to analyzing 
technological fair use is to identify the stage of development in which the 
alleged fair use is made—the creation, operation, or output of the speech 
technology. As a rough guide, more leeway should be allowed for more 
extensive uses of copyrighted works at the creation and operation stages of 
a technology versus the output stage. This proposed Creation-Operation-
Output spectrum informs the analysis of the four factors of fair use. Part V 
applies the framework to Google Book Search and the Kindle text-to-
speech function and concludes that both involve technological fair uses. 
Part VI addresses several concerns arising from this framework of 
technological fair use.  
II.  TOWARD THE EMERGENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE 
The Copyright Act codifies the judge-made doctrine of fair use by 
stating simply: “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by 
[17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 106A], for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”39 Although 
Congress anticipated that new technologies would affect the analysis,40 it 
chose to list only four factors to consider when analyzing fair use.41 
Technology is nowhere mentioned. Yet technological fair use has become 
an emerging, though inchoate, concept in several cases of profound 
importance for our information economy.  
A.  TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE CASES FROM 1984 TO 2010 
Although courts have yet to recognize formally technological fair use 
as a doctrine, the following cases support the adoption of such a doctrine. 
The cases all share a set of common features that distinguish them from 
other fair use cases: the fair uses, often involving verbatim copying, were 
made for the new or value-adding purpose of creating, operating, and/or 
providing output of a speech technology or application.  
 
 39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 40. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.  
 41. These factors are  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.  
17 U.S.C. § 107. The last sentence of § 107 clarifies that “[t]he fact that a work is unpublished shall not 
itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.” Id.  
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1.  Successful Technological Fair Use Cases 
To summarize very briefly, courts have recognized fair use related to 
the following technological functions, listed in chronological order by case: 
(1) in Sony, the time-shift recording of entire television programs on the 
VCR at home;42 (2) in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. and its 
progeny, the reverse engineering and intermediate copying of entire 
software programs to achieve interoperability for an independently written 
software program;43 (3) in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc v. Nintendo of America, 
Inc., the enhancing or altering of the visual display of copyrighted works 
on a video game console (without creating a copy);44 (4) in Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft Corp.,45Field v. Google Inc.,46 and their progeny,47 the copying of the 
entirety of millions of photographs and web pages for use in databases to 
create and operate Internet search engines, such as for visual searching of 
 
 42. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Samuelson 
characterizes Sony as involving a technology that facilitates personal uses of copyrighted works. See 
Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 37, at 2603–05. Although I start with Sony as the first technological 
fair use case, several older copyright cases involved technologies. In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United 
States, the Court of Claims upheld as fair use the copying of journals by the National Institutes of 
Health and the National Library of Medicine for professional use. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
Even before that, the Supreme Court decided a case involving the pianola, a self-playing piano, 
although not under fair use. See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 12 (1908), 
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544–45 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). I categorize some of these early technology cases as quasi-
technological fair use cases. See infra notes 366–67, 372 and accompanying text. Because most of these 
older cases did not involve a decision on fair use, I have not used them in my framework.  
 43. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). Subsequent cases have 
built on this doctrine. See Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 37, at 2608–09 & nn.512–13 (listing “the 
stream of cases involving reverse engineering” that followed Sega). See also Assessment Techs. of WI, 
LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that copyright law did not prevent the 
copying of a database in order to obtain the underlying uncopyrighted data stored in the software); Sony 
Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603–05 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that reverse 
engineering of a video game so it could be played on computers as well as Sony’s console system 
constituted fair use); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that 
reverse engineering of a computer program to uncover the original source code from the object code 
may constitute fair use); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843–44 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (recognizing the use of a reverse engineering process to derive an object code from a computer 
chip as fair use).  
 44. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). Although 
Samuelson categorizes Galoob as a competition or innovation-promoting use in software, see 
Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 37, at 2605–06 & n.483, I think it would also fit well as a personal 
use technology in her taxonomy. 
 45. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 46. Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 47. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the operator’s display of thumbnail images of the copyright owner’s photographs constituted fair 
use). 
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images or for storage and display of cached copies of Web pages; and 
(5) in A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, the copying of the 
entirety of numerous written works for use in a database in order to create 
and operate the defendant’s antiplagiarism software.48 
2.  Unsuccessful Technological Fair Use Cases 
In contrast, courts have rejected fair use defenses regarding the 
following technological functions: (1) in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., the unauthorized sharing of music files;49 (2) in UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., the copying of music files for use in an online 
“space shifting” service through which subscribers could access music 
online upon proof they already owned the CD version of the recording;50 
(3) in Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh, the copying of movies 
in order to create edited, “family friendly” versions that removed or edited 
any scenes containing sex, violence, or profanity;51 and (4) in Apple, Inc. v. 
Psystar Corp., the mass copying and modification of Apple’s Mac 
operating system onto non-Apple, or so-called Open Mac, computers.52  
B.  CONCEPTUALIZING TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE 
One approach to analyzing the above cases would be to consider all of 
them separately, each simply presenting its own unique issue of fair use. 
This approach would follow the predominant practice of treating fair use on 
a case-by-case basis. The better approach, however, is to understand these 
cases as raising the same type of fair use claim: technological fair use. The 
presence of a speech technology in these cases makes the fair use analysis 
 
 48. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 49. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 50. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 51. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006). Congress 
enacted an exemption from liability for DVD-skipping technology (for example, Clear Play) that would 
allow software to skip over profanity, nudity, violence, and other scenes as long as no copy was created 
of the edited playback. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2006) (providing an exemption for “the making 
imperceptible . . . of limited portions of audio or video content of a motion picture . . . if no fixed copy 
of the altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer program or other technology”). 
Because CleanFlicks created and distributed edited copies, however, it did not fall within this 
exemption.  
 52. Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931, 935–36 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Some services, 
especially on the Internet, might arguably be classified as technologies. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. 
Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting the fair use defense for a service 
that created unauthorized movie trailers); L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM 
(AJWx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2000) (rejecting the fair use defense for a 
bulletin board website that posted news articles for comments by users). This Article does not discuss 
all of these cases, but instead focuses on prominent examples to illustrate my theory.  
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more complex and more deserving of special treatment. 
1.  The Need for Case Synthesis 
Despite the different technological functions at issue, all of the cases 
discussed above share a common set of features: they all involve a 
technology that in some way used copyrighted works without the copyright 
owner’s permission at some stage in that technology’s development, 
whether at its creation, operation, or output stage. In all of the cases, the 
legality of the unauthorized use of the copyrighted works decided, for all 
intents and purposes, not just the legality of the particular uses of the 
copyrighted works, but also the marketability of the technology itself. In the 
successful fair use cases above, all of the technologies continued. In the 
unsuccessful cases, all of the specific technologies ceased to exist.53 One 
exception is the case of music file sharing, as decentralized peer-to-peer 
software later evolved to escape the liability faced by Napster.54 These 
cases are different from other fair use cases—such as quoting a passage, 
borrowing a few musical notes, or displaying a work in the classroom—in 
which there is no underlying technology itself at issue.  
The starting premise of this Article is that courts should understand all 
of these cases as raising a common question over a distinct type of fair use 
involving a speech technology. Unfortunately, courts have yet to do so. 
This lack of recognition is symptomatic of a larger problem with fair use 
jurisprudence generally—that it is notoriously vague and overinsistently ad 
hoc. Besides the adoption of “transformative use” or “transformative 
purpose” as a relevant factor in examining the first factor of fair use (the 
 
 53. Napster and MP3.com had to file for bankruptcy. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 
377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“After concluding that it was not technologically feasible to 
comply with the court’s . . . order and continue operating its file-sharing network, Napster ceased 
operations on July 1, 2001.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, Review Essay, The First Amendment’s Biggest 
Threat, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1798, 1833 (2005) (“Within a year, the studios sued MP3.com into 
bankruptcy . . . .”). CleanFlicks has changed its business entirely and is now an online subscription 
service that offers rentals of family-friendly movies. See Jasen Lee, CleanFlicks Bounces Back, Offers 
Online DVD Rentals, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Jan. 10, 2008, at E01. Psystar also saw its business 
end, as it was permanently enjoined from selling its Open Mac computers. See Apple Inc. v. Psystar 
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  
 54. Decentralization—meaning here the lack of involvement in the actual use of the software—
afforded a way for software developers to fall within the Sony safe harbor, which protects technologies 
with substantial noninfringing uses from secondary liability. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1984). Because peer-to-peer software has substantial noninfringing 
uses to disseminate authorized and public domain works, it falls within the Sony safe harbor. However, 
the Supreme Court clarified that the Sony safe harbor would not protect developers who actively 
induced its users to infringe copyrighted works. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934–37 (2005). 
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purpose and character of the use),55 and the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
parody as a distinctive form of fair use in 1994,56 courts have tended to 
stick very closely to the same—at times, rote—discussion of the four fair 
use factors without considering the possibility of the emergence of any new 
patterns or types of fair use implicated in a certain case.57 This ad hoc 
approach, while sensitive to the facts of each case, gives practically no 
guidance to the public on what constitutes permissible fair use. 
This approach is not the best way to administer fair use, at least not as 
a universal approach for all cases. Applying a case-by-case approach to fair 
use has its merits when fine tailoring is needed, but it does not preclude the 
possibility of identifying certain specific types of fair use, an endeavor that 
Samuelson has recently renewed.58 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s most 
extensive discussion of fair use to date, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., recognizes parody as a type of fair use that requires a generalized 
tailoring of the fair use factors.59 Although each claimed parody fair use 
must be judged on a case-by-case basis,60 the Court tailored each of the 
four fair use factors to analyze the special type of parody fair use.61 As 
discussed below in Part IV, a similar kind of tailoring should be applied to 
technological fair use cases. 
 
 55. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The adoption of this 
factor was derived from Judge Leval’s insight in his highly influential Harvard Law Review article in 
1990. See Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111–
16 (1990). 
 56. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 599 F. Supp. 2d 
415, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (instructing that courts must examine the four fair use factors and “undertake 
a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a given secondary use of a copyrighted work is a fair 
use”). 
 58. See Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 37 (arguing that fair use law is more coherent and 
predictable than is commonly believed if the fair use cases are seen as falling into common patterns). 
See also Alan Latman, Study No. 14, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (Mar. 1958), reprinted in 2 
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781 (Copyright Soc’y of Am. ed., Arthur Fisher memorial ed. 1963). 
 59. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581. 
 60. Id. (“[P]arody, like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be 
judged case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law.”). 
 61. Id. at 582 (tailoring the first factor to examine “whether a parodic character may reasonably 
be perceived”); id. at 586 (tailoring the second factor to acknowledge that the factor itself, the nature of 
the copyrighted work, “is not much help in this case, or ever likely to help much in separating the fair 
use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly 
known, expressive works”); id. at 588 (tailoring the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the 
copied portion, to acknowledge that parodies must copy some of the copyrighted work in order to “be 
able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable”); 
id. at 592 (tailoring the fourth factor to not consider “harm to the market” for a copyrighted work 
caused by an effective parody of the work). 
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Another problem related to the lack of formal recognition of 
technological fair use is the lack of coherence in how courts have dealt with 
fair use in technology cases. The cases have applied two very different and 
inconsistent understandings of the transformative factor in these types of 
cases. When a fair use is found, courts have typically applied a broader 
understanding of the term “transformative” to include the use of exact 
copies of the entire copyrighted work for a new purpose.62 Thus, a 
transformative purpose in copying a work for a new technology—such as a 
search engine or antiplagiarism technology—can weigh in favor of fair use, 
notwithstanding the fact that the copy is an exact copy of the original. 
However, in rejecting fair use claims in technological cases, other courts 
have applied a very narrow understanding of “transformative” to examine 
only whether some new content has been added to the copyrighted work 
itself.63 Under this approach, a new purpose in using exactly the same work 
as the original for a new technology is not transformative at all. These two 
conflicting standards of “transformative” cannot be reconciled and have 
created unnecessary confusion in the case law. 
2.  The Basic Definition of Technological Fair Use 
To clear up this doctrinal confusion and provide better guidance to the 
public, courts should recognize a distinct category of technological fair use. 
By “technological fair use,” I mean to describe a category of fair use—like 
parody fair use—that recurs with certain characteristics in different cases. 
In the case of parody fair use, the cases are defined by the person’s use of a 
copyrighted work to parody it. In the case of technological fair use, the use 
is for a new or value-adding purpose of creating, operating, or providing 
 
 62. See, e.g., A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(finding that the use of the plaintiff’s works in the antiplagiarism detection system was transformative 
because it had an entirely different function and purpose than the original works, and that the fact that 
there was no alteration to the works did not preclude finding that use to be transformative); Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721–23 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Google’s use of images 
for its visual search index was highly transformative because the use served a different function than the 
original images served); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–20 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the 
use of the copyright owner’s images for online visual searches transformative because it served a 
different function than the owner’s use); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1111 (D. Nev. 
2006) (finding that because the Google search engine’s use of cached snapshots of websites pages 
served a different purpose from that of the original works, use of these copyrighted works was 
transformative). 
 63. See, e.g., Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241 (D. Colo. 
2006) (finding that the family-friendly, edited versions of movies added nothing new to the original and 
were therefore not transformative under the first factor of fair use); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 
Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no transformative use because the space shifting 
added nothing new to the original songs, instead “simply repackag[ing] those recordings to facilitate 
their transmission through another medium”). 
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an output of a technology or application.  
Yet this is not to say that all new uses of copyrighted works to create 
or operate a technology are fair uses. Some should not be. Just as some 
asserted parody fair uses may go too far and fall outside the exemption, so 
too some asserted technological fair uses may fail to qualify for the 
exemption. Later in this Article, I outline a framework to help separate fair 
versus unfair technological uses. For now, it is important to understand 
what kind of cases fall under the rubric of technological fair use. This part 
has identified the common factual features that distinguish technological 
fair use cases. The next part identifies the normative bases that further 
distinguish this category of fair use. 
III.  THE THEORY UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE 
Unfortunately, the relationship between technologies and fair use 
remains undertheorized. Only a few articles have entertained a possible 
connection between the two.64 To the extent that a theory has been offered 
to justify this connection, it has focused narrowly on economic reasons.65 
While important, economic theories of fair use are inadequate to provide 
the entire, or even primary, normative basis for fair use. As the Supreme 
Court has recognized, the fair use doctrine is a First Amendment safeguard 
for speech activities.66 By promoting the development of speech 
technologies that enable greater speech activities, technological fair use can 
serve “double duty” in this important role as a First Amendment safeguard 
by serving the freedoms of both the speech and the press. The doctrine also 
serves both goals of the Copyright and Patent Clause, to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts. This four-goal underpinning—
serving the values of free speech, free press, science, and useful arts—
 
 64. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 65. See, e.g., Sag, supra note 38, at 1639–57 (proposing a theory of nonexpressive use of works 
under fair use based on an economic analysis of transaction costs); Moore, supra note 38, at 959–65 
(arguing that traditional fair use analysis does not fully take into account economic incentives to authors 
and technology companies); Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 840–43 (examining copying technologies 
that have developed complementary economic relationships with the copyrighted works). Sigmund 
Timberg’s work is a notable exception that discusses the importance of the Copyright Clause and the 
First Amendment in understanding how fair use should be applied for technologies. See Timberg, supra 
note 36, at 229 (“The question remains why the first amendment and the copyright clause, two 
constitutional provisions that both stress the dissemination of information and ideas to the public, and 
access by the public to information and ideas, should be following their separate legal tracks, with the 
courts never taking cognizance of the fact that the two provisions are following parallel routes to similar 
destinations.”). 
 66. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (explaining that fair use “allows the 
public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself”).  
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distinguishes technological fair use cases from other fair use cases, which 
typically involve only two constitutional goals, the freedom of speech and 
the progress of science. This part elaborates these theories underlying 
technological fair use. 
A.  CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS  
Technological fair use serves four different, but related, goals of the 
Free Speech, Free Press, and Copyright and Patent Clauses.67 Each of these 
clauses provides a constitutional underpinning for technological fair use. 
By “constitutional underpinning,” I mean a foundation from the 
Constitution on which a doctrine rests. The doctrine itself does not 
necessarily have to be constitutionally required, although it may be. 
Sometimes, the Court does not resolve whether it is required, yet the 
doctrine nonetheless operates prophylactically or as a safeguard within an 
area of law.68 The doctrine, particularly if codified by statute, may also be a 
way for a court to avoid results that would raise constitutional doubt, while 
avoiding a ruling of constitutional nature.69 This section discusses the 
constitutional underpinnings for technological fair use, while leaving 
undecided the larger question of whether fair use is constitutionally 
required, just as the Supreme Court has done.70  
 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press . . . .”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). The Supreme Court has typically viewed the freedom of 
speech and the freedom of the press as two clauses, albeit related. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 839 (1994) (using the terminology, “when applying the Free Speech and Press Clauses”). By 
contrast, the Court has referred to Congress’s copyright and patent power in Article I as one clause but 
at times has also referred to it as two clauses. Compare Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192 (referring to “[t]he 
Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution”), with Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (referring to “the Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution”). 
However sliced, the clauses dealing with free speech, free press, the copyright power, and the patent 
power pertain to at least four distinct areas or purposes, as I discuss in Part III.A below. As long as we 
recognize these four distinct purposes, I do not think it matters if one characterizes free speech/free 
press or copyright/patent powers as one or two clauses. The Constitution is not mathematics. 
 68. See Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of 
Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1999) (discussing prophylactic rules in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence). 
 69. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (discussing the canon of construction of avoiding constitutional doubt as applied 
to the interpretation of congressional statutes). 
 70. The Supreme Court has indicated its view that fair use is a central feature “necessary” for our 
copyright system: “From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of 
copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 
(1994) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). In Eldred, the Court also stated 
DO NOT DELETE 8/9/2010 9:41:24 AM 
2010] TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE 813 
  
 
1.  Technological Fair Use and the First Amendment 
Fair use is a judge-made doctrine that dates back to the very “infancy 
of copyright protection”71 and establishes one of the “traditional contours” 
of our copyright system.72 The Supreme Court has recognized that the fair 
use doctrine operates as an internal “First Amendment safeguard[]” within 
copyright law that works prophylactically to keep copyright law from 
infringing First Amendment rights.73 It does so by providing breathing 
room for speech activities involving copyrighted works, even though the 
activities have not been authorized by the copyright holders. More 
typically, these speech activities promote the freedom of speech, such as 
through commentary and criticism of copyrighted works. But in the case of 
technological fair use, it serves not only the freedom of speech, but also the 
freedom of the press—meaning the development of speech technologies. 
a.  Freedom of the Press and Protecting Speech Technologies 
First, the Free Press Clause: although long overlooked in legal 
scholarship, this Clause provides a central underpinning for technological 
fair use. As I have recounted in prior scholarship, the Framers intended the 
Free Press Clause to act as a direct limit on Congress’s ability to regulate 
speech technologies under the Copyright Clause.74 To the framing 
generation, the freedom of the press meant originally the “freedom of the 
printing press.”75 One of the chief evils in sixteenth-century England that 
 
that First Amendment scrutiny would be required if Congress changed a traditional contour of 
copyright, such as the fair use doctrine. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. For scholarship making the claim that 
fair use is constitutionally required, see Jonathan Band, Google and Fair Use, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 6 
(2008) (arguing that “fair use is a constitutionally required structural element that harmonizes the 
copyright law with the First Amendment”); Stanley F. Birch, Brace Memorial Lecture, Copyright Fair 
Use: A Constitutional Imperative, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 141, 165 (2007) (characterizing 
“fair use” as having “constitutional dimensions”); Stephen M. McJohn, Eldred’s Aftermath: Tradition, 
the Copyright Clause, and the Constitutionalization of Fair Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 95, 128–33 (2003) (arguing that after Eldred, fair use has attained constitutional status). 
 71. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575. 
 72. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 73. See id. at 219–20. See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
560 (1985) (discussing First Amendment protections embodied in the Copyright Act). 
 74. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 318–51. See also Edward Lee, Guns and 
Speech Technologies: How the Right to Bear Arms Affects Copyright Regulations of Speech 
Technologies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1037, 1045–64 (2009) [hereinafter Lee, Guns and Speech 
Technologies] (discussing the significance of the fact that the Free Press Clause and Second 
Amendment are the only constitutional provisions that expressly protect individual rights to a 
technology). For simplicity, I will not cite here again all of the documentary sources contemporaneous 
with the Framing that support my theory. These sources are cited and at times quoted at length in my 
prior scholarship.  
 75. Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies, supra note 74, at 1047 (emphasis added). 
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the Framers wished to combat was the imposition of severe limits on the 
technology of the printing press, such as its ownership and the total number 
of presses allowed in England.76 By controlling the technology of the press, 
the Crown (and later Parliament) sought to control both heresy77 and 
piracy78 of copyrighted works, with the latter goal intended to serve the 
interests of the Stationers’ Company, the de facto copyright holders of the 
period.79 That repressive regime in England—codified by the various 
Printing Acts—lasted over a century, but was eventually dismantled with a 
movement among the populace for a freedom of the press and the 
enactment in 1710 of a less restrictive alternative in the Statute of Anne, 
England’s first copyright act.80 Notably, the Statute of Anne did not 
replicate any of the repressive technology limits contained in the prior 
Printing Acts.81 The change was monumental. As Blackstone wrote, once 
the restrictions under the Printing Acts ended, “the press became properly 
free . . . and has ever since so continued.”82  
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution were informed by this history 
and sought to avoid the same problems of press controls that had occurred 
in England. The Copyright Clause and first Copyright Act were modeled in 
part on the Statute of Anne.83 But the Framers did Parliament one better—
by codifying the freedom of the press in the Bill of Rights.84  
This codification of the freedom of the press in the Bill of Rights was 
intended to remove any doubt that Congress had no authority whatsoever to 
use the Copyright Clause—or, for that matter, any other clause—to restrict 
the technology of the press. During the ratification debates, the Anti-
 
 76. See id. at 1061–62; Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 329. 
 77. See Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies, supra note 74, at 1061. 
 78. See id. at 1061–62. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 327–28; Lee, Guns and Speech 
Technologies, supra note 74, at 1062–63. 
 81. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 327–28; Lee, Guns and Speech 
Technologies, supra note 74, at 1062. 
 82. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152. 
 83. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 349–52 (1998) (discussing 
the role the Statute of Anne played in the development of U.S. copyright law). See also Fred Fisher 
Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 647–50 (1943) (same), superseded by statute, 
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573–76 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 304 (2006)).  
 84. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 332–39 (discussing the debate between 
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the clause); Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies, supra note 
74, at 1063–64 (same); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Essay, Copyright in 1791: An Essay 
Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 942–43 (2003). 
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Federalists successfully argued that the Free Press Clause was needed 
specifically to limit the government’s potential power under the Copyright 
Clause to restrict the press in service of copyright holders.85 As James 
Madison, a Federalist and the drafter of the first proposal for the Free Press 
Clause, recognized, “[T]he article of amendment, instead of supposing in 
Congress a power that might be exercised over the press, provided its 
freedom was not abridged, was meant as a positive denial to Congress of 
any power whatever on the subject.”86 
Thus, the Free Press Clause is a protection for speech technologies, 
especially against restrictions effectuated through copyright law in service 
of copyright holders. Although the Supreme Court has yet to tease out this 
important history of the Free Press Clause and its connection to copyright 
law,87 in the Court’s defense, thus far it has not had many cases in which it 
has had the opportunity to do so. For more than two hundred years of our 
nation’s history, dating back to the first Copyright Act in 1790, our 
copyright law has avoided imposing any direct restriction on speech 
technologies.88 A traditional contour of our copyright law has been to keep 
copyright law from regulating speech technologies.  
Although this tradition is increasingly being tested today by copyright 
holders’ efforts to use copyright law to restrict technologies, the Supreme 
Court has offered one doctrinal solution—the Sony safe harbor—that 
 
 85. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 331–39; Lee, Guns and Speech 
Technologies, supra note 74, at 1063–64. 
 86. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 141, 143 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (emphasis added). Before the 
Bill of Rights’ adoption, the Federalists tried to maintain that a free press clause was unnecessary 
because Congress had no power to restrict the press under the original Constitution. For example, James 
Iredell, a leading Federalist and later an original Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, stated, “If the 
Congress should exercise any other power over the press than this [grant of copyrights for a limited 
time], they will do it without any warrant from this constitution, and must answer for it as for any other 
act of tyranny.” James Iredell, Observations on George Mason’s Objections to the Federal Constitution 
(1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING 
ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1787–1788, at 333, 361 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888). Yet this 
standard Federalist argument did not assuage the Anti-Federalists’ and people’s desire for an expressly 
written out free press clause limiting Congress’s power to restrict the press.  
 87. The Court has briefly discussed the intersection between the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment and the Copyright Clause. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“The First 
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears 
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to 
be the engine of free expression.”). 
 88. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 352 (“From 1790 to 1992 every U.S. 
copyright law enacted stayed clear of direct regulation of the machines that enabled mass copying and 
publication.” (footnote omitted)).  
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provides some breathing room for the development of speech 
technologies.89 Under the Sony safe harbor, a developer of a technology 
cannot be held secondarily liable for the infringement committed by users 
of the technology if the technology is capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.90 Elsewhere, I have attempted to show how the Sony safe harbor 
operates as a traditional First Amendment safeguard in copyright law, 
much like fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy.91 By providing a 
safe harbor for the development of speech technologies free from copyright 
lawsuits, the Sony safe harbor serves the important free press goal of 
protecting speech technologies from intrusive governmental restrictions.92 
The doctrine of technological fair use does the same, but at the level 
of direct copyright liability. Whereas the Sony safe harbor protects speech 
technologies from secondary liability claims, technological fair use does so 
against direct liability claims.  
For example, in Sony, the Court’s finding of fair use based on time-
shift recordings went to the issue of direct liability of users of VCRs.93 That 
finding was also relevant to the Court’s application of the Sony safe harbor 
in the secondary liability claim against Sony because the fair use recordings 
demonstrated that the VCR was capable of a substantial noninfringing 
use.94 Both rulings in Sony—the fair use decision on time-shifting by 
consumers and the application of the Sony safe harbor to the VCR—help to 
provide breathing room for the development of speech technologies, 
consistent with the Free Press Clause. In this respect, technological fair use 
cases are special. In fair use cases without technologies, this free press 
interest is simply absent.  
b.  Free Speech Activities 
The more commonly recognized connection between fair use and the 
First Amendment is the protection that fair use provides within the 
copyright system for the freedom of speech.95 This free speech rationale 
applies generally to all kinds of fair use, not just technological fair uses. 
 
 89. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 90. Id. The Court has subsequently held that the safe harbor does not apply where a developer 
actively induced others to engage in infringement. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935–37 (2005) (discussing active inducement liability). 
 91. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 369–79. 
 92. See id. at 373–79. 
 93. Sony, 464 U.S. at 447–56. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (characterizing fair use as a “free speech 
safeguard[]”). 
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The basic idea is that fair use provides some breathing room for speech-
related activities.96 As the Court has explained, “The fair use 
doctrine . . . ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity 
which that law is designed to foster.’”97  
Fair use is needed as a First Amendment safeguard within copyright 
law, even though copyrights are generally viewed by the Supreme Court as 
speech promoting or, in the oft-quoted phrase, “the engine of free 
expression.”98 As the Court noted, “By establishing a marketable right to 
the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to 
create and disseminate ideas.”99 But this incentive rationale of copyright is 
not enough to keep it from raising First Amendment problems. To borrow 
the Court’s metaphor, sometimes the engine of free expression breaks 
down or needs a coolant or lubrication. Fair use is one of the internal First 
Amendment safeguards meant to keep the so-called engine of free 
expression on track and running smoothly. Thus, in one well-recognized 
example of fair use, people can quote passages of copyrighted works 
without authorization in order to critique or review it.100 
Technological fair uses promote speech activities in somewhat 
different ways than other fair uses, such as quotations. Technological fair 
uses have the potential to provide additional engines of free expression. In 
this sense, they can promote potentially greater First Amendment interests 
(at least in terms of the number of people affected) than the run-of-the-mill 
fair use case, given the possibility that the new speech technology in 
question can affect an exponential number of speech activities among the 
millions of people using that technology. Instead of just one fair use, 
technological fair use can facilitate many. For example, at the height of its 
popularity, the VCR was owned by close to 90 percent of all U.S. 
households.101 Likewise, today, Google’s search engine is used by 
hundreds of millions of people, with over nine billion search requests per 
 
 96. Some scholars doubt whether, in practice, fair use adequately serves this interest. See, e.g., 
Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine as a Protector of Free Speech, 24 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: 
How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). 
 97. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
 98. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Section 107 recognizes fair uses for the purposes of “criticism, comment, . . . [and] 
scholarship.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 101. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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month made in the United States alone.102 And the speech activity that is 
facilitated by the speech technology may be an entirely new kind of speech 
activity than before. For example, before the VCR, people did not record 
shows at home. 
The timing of the speech activity may also differ in technological fair 
use cases. In the run-of-the-mill fair use case, such as quoting copyrighted 
expression to critique it, fair use is often tied directly to the creation or 
dissemination of more speech. However, in technological fair uses, that is 
not necessarily the case. Instead, technological fair use is often tied directly 
to the creation of a speech technology, but the timing of the creation or 
dissemination of speech varies. Sometimes, it is close in time, as in the 
Sega case, which involved Accolade’s creation of a new game soon after its 
fair use of Sega’s programming code to find the specifications necessary to 
make the game interoperable on Sega consoles.103 Other times, the timing 
is more delayed. For example, fair use of copyrighted works to create 
antiplagiarism software directly produces a new speech technology, which 
in turn indirectly creates more long-term incentives for students to create 
their own speech—without plagiarizing other students’ works.104 Likewise, 
fair use of copyrighted works to create a more advanced Internet search 
engine directly yields a new technology105 and may lead to better research 
that may eventually play a part in the creation of new expression. Finally, 
in some cases, no new work is created from the fair use, such as in Sony, 
where the recordings of television shows led primarily to the greater 
dissemination of the same copyrighted works subject to fair use.106 
2.  Technological Fair Use and the Copyright and Patent Clause  
The Copyright and Patent Clause provides another constitutional 
underpinning for technological fair use in addition to the First Amendment. 
a.  Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts 
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of fair use 
generally in serving the ends of the Copyright and Patent Clause: “From 
the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of 
 
 102. Trouble in the Google-Verse: Users Report Problems Using Google Search Engine, Gmail, 
Other Features, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 14, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/tech_guide/2009/05/ 
14/2009-05-14_trouble_in_the_googleverse_users_report_problems_using_google_search_engine_ 
gmai.html. 
 103. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1515–16 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 104. See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 105. See Perfect 10, Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 711–12, 721–23 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 106. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). 
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copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very 
purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’”107 
The Supreme Court, however, has shied away from fully defining what 
constitutes “the Progress of Science” or “useful Arts.” Intellectual property 
historians have contended that, at the time of the Framing, “the Progress of 
Science” meant learning or knowledge (referring to the goal of 
copyright),108 while “useful Arts” meant technology or innovation (the goal 
of the patent system).109 The Court has made clear that “[t]he economic 
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents 
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”110 
Because of this overriding public interest rationale of the Copyright 
and Patent Clause, our copyright and patent laws are not intended to serve 
primarily the individual copyright or patent holder, but instead the public at 
large.111 To help achieve this end, courts have developed various doctrines 
to accommodate the public interest.112  
 
 107. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (alteration in original) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8). 
 108. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing E. 
WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 125–26 (2002)) (arguing that the Copyright Clause is to promote “the progress of 
‘Science’—by which word the Framers meant learning or knowledge”). See also Cary v. Kearsley, 
(1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B.) (“[W]hile I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the 
enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science.”).  
 109. See Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies, supra note 74, at 1046; Karl B. Lutz, Patents and 
Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 
(1949). 
 110. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2541–44 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
 111. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) 
(“The patent laws ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ by rewarding innovation with a 
temporary monopoly.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of 
authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8)); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.” (footnote omitted)); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 
286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring 
the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”); Motion 
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (“[T]he primary purpose of 
our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is ‘to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts’ . . . .” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
 112. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 349–50 (“To this end, copyright assures authors the right 
to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information 
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Fair use is one such doctrine. Fair use promotes knowledge and 
learning, as § 107 specifically recognizes “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, [and] research”113 as exemplary 
purposes of fair use. These types of fair use directly relate to learning or the 
cultivation of knowledge. A person attempting to make fair use of a 
copyrighted work for one of these recognized purposes, such as criticism of 
or commentary on a published work, is more than likely learning 
something and possibly adding to the sum of our knowledge. 
Technological fair use is different from—and, in some respects, has a 
greater impact than—other fair uses. In short, technological fair use can 
serve the goals of promoting both the progress of science and the useful 
arts—which does not usually happen in nontechnological fair uses. First, 
technological fair uses typically result in the immediate public benefit of 
the created speech technology—for example, the VCR,114 Internet search 
engines,115 and antiplagiarism software116—which promotes innovation or 
the useful arts, an aim more commonly attributed to the patent system. 
And, if the technology developed is not patented or protected as a trade 
secret, then the public at large can benefit immediately from the know-how 
possibly entering the public domain without the twenty-year monopoly 
period that is secured by a patent.117 An additional public benefit is derived 
from use of the technology (for example, a search engine to find 
information), which can promote the more typical benefits of fair use such 
as learning and knowledge—but often on an exponential scale among 
millions of users that cannot be matched by a nontechnological fair use. 
b.  Avoiding Back-Door Patents Through Copyright over Functional 
Elements  
Another reason for recognizing technological fair use is that it can 
serve as an important buffer between the copyright and patent systems. As 
the seminal case of Baker v. Selden118 teaches, copyright holders should not 
be allowed to attain patent-like control over functional elements through 
 
conveyed by a work.” (citation omitted)). 
 113. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 114. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 115. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 116. See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 117. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). See also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63–64 
(1998) (discussing how the patent system grants exclusive monopolies for a limited period of time). 
 118. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), superseded by statute, Architectural Works Copyright 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, sec. 703, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a)). 
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their copyrights.119 In Baker, the Court held that certain accounting forms 
could not be copyrighted because they instantiated the useful method of 
accounting that the copyright holder failed to patent; rather, “[t]he claim to 
an invention or discovery of an art or manufacture must be subjected to the 
examination of the Patent Office before an exclusive right therein can be 
obtained; and it can only be secured by a patent from the government.”120  
This teaching of Baker is codified today in § 102(b) of the Copyright 
Act.121 Although copyright law today allows copyrights over expressive 
works with functional elements (such as computer programs; pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works; and architectural works), various doctrines 
have developed, in addition to § 102(b), to avoid turning a copyright into a 
de facto patent.122 Likewise, the Sony safe harbor can be understood as a 
way to prevent copyright holders from attaining a patent-like right to 
dictate the design of a functional technology.123 The Sony Court viewed the 
copyright holders’ claims against Sony as the functional equivalent of 
asserting “the exclusive right to distribute VTR’s”—which, although the 
Court stopped short of characterizing it this way, is arguably tantamount to 
one of the exclusive rights under a patent.124 In addition to this safe harbor, 
the copyright misuse doctrine protects against similar concerns.125 
 
 119. Id. at 102–04. 
 120. Id. See also Lemley, supra note 38, at 134 (“Apparently, the Framers had a sort of one-two 
punch in mind: patent owners create new mediums, while copyright owners create new content to 
disseminate through those mediums.”). For an excellent account of this teaching of Baker, see Pamela 
Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship and 
Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, supra note 6, at 159. 
 121. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). In at least one technological fair use case, the anti-“back-door” 
patent rationale was expressly recognized. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 
1526 (9th Cir. 1992) (“If disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair use, the owner of 
the copyright gains a de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of his work—aspects that were 
expressly denied copyright protection by Congress.” (citation omitted)). 
 122. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that 
copyright protection for software does not extend to methods that are performed with program 
guidance); Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating 
that copyright protection is given when there is separability between the utilitarian and artistic aspects 
of a work). 
 123. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441 n.21 (1984) (“It 
seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon all copyright owners collectively, 
much less the two respondents in this case, the exclusive right to distribute VTR’s simply because they 
may be used to infringe copyrights.”). See also Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 379 
(“Copyright law does not protect useful systems—that is the province of patents.”). 
 124. Sony, 464 U.S. at 441 n.21. See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 125. Under the misuse doctrine, a copyright or patent holder who “misuses” copyright or patent is 
barred from suing for infringement. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 
1990) (“But the public policy which includes [original works] within the granted monopoly excludes 
from it all that is not embraced in the [original expression]. It equally forbids the use of the [copyright] 
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Likewise, technological fair use provides an additional buffer between 
copyright and patent law. It avoids giving copyright holders the ability to 
control new speech technologies or prevent their development (the so-
called veto power) when the copyright holders have not yet patented the 
technology in question. This buffer is necessary because innovation of 
speech technologies should not be left to the wishes of copyright industries. 
In sum, technological fair use cases typically serve four constitutional 
values (press, speech, science, and useful arts), whereas other fair use cases 
typically involve only two (speech and science). Because technological fair 
use cases do, in effect, double constitutional duty compared to other fair 
use cases, courts should recognize technological fair use as a discrete 
category for more specialized treatment. 
B.  ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE 
Technological fair use can also be justified on economic grounds as a 
way to provide breathing room for developers who wish to innovate in 
developing new speech technologies—technologies that play an increasing 
part in the growth of the U.S. economy. 
1.  Breathing Room to Develop Speech Technologies and More “Engines 
of Free Expression” 
Recognizing technological fair use as a doctrine can help provide 
greater incentives for developers to develop and investors to invest in 
speech technologies. As the Supreme Court explained in the context of 
discussing the Sony safe harbor, copyright law should provide “breathing 
room for innovation and a vigorous commerce.”126 The Sony safe harbor 
does so by providing developers a safe harbor from secondary liability for 
developing a technology that is capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.127 Although a technological fair use doctrine would not have the same 
level of categorical certainty as a safe harbor, it could provide more 
guidance to developers on what constitutes fair use than the current ad hoc 
approach. 
Greater clarity is preferable for our copyright system. As the Court 
recognized in the patent context, “[C]larity is essential to promote progress, 
 
to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the [Copyright] Office and which it is 
contrary to public policy to grant.” (alterations in original) (quoting Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 
314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942))). See also Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 901, 924–41 (2004) (discussing the possible theories underlying the copyright misuse doctrine). 
 126. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005). 
 127. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
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because it enables efficient investment in innovation,”128 a view shared by 
the law-and-economics school.129 Chief Justice Rehnquist summed it up 
best: “Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the 
general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important 
that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as 
possible.”130 
Breathing room is important for the development of technologies 
because new technologies are inherently difficult, if not impossible, to 
predict. As Clayton Christensen has explained in his pathbreaking study on 
disruptive technologies, “[N]either manufacturers nor customers know how 
or why the products will be used, and hence do not know what specific 
features of the product will and will not ultimately be valued.”131 Or, more 
succinctly, “Markets that don’t exist can’t be analyzed.”132 L. Gordon 
Crovitz’s chronicle of the Top 10 Worst Technology Predictions of all time 
illuminates how even the brightest minds routinely blunder in predicting 
new technologies and their social value.133 
Faced with this inherent unpredictability, policymakers should favor a 
decentralized approach, allowing breathing room for many different types 
 
 128. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730–31 (2002). Cf. 
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 613 (1992) (arguing 
that “postponing the establishment of precedents that will guide future activity . . . involves a high cost, 
as behavior in the interim will not benefit from the guidance of whatever precedent might later be set”); 
Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) 
(noting an “obvious advantage of establishing . . . a clear, general principle of decision: predictability”). 
In the abstract, uncertainty in the law can produce over- and underdeterrence. See Ben Depoorter, 
Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1836–37 
(2009). For example, in some contexts, uncertainty over fair use may “chill” speech by causing people 
who would pursue legitimate fair uses to be scared off by the possibility of being sued by copyright 
holders. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1543–
44 (2008) [hereinafter Lee, Warming Up]. Yet, in other contexts, uncertainty may help bring about 
“warming” of speech by emboldening people to engage in activities (some legitimate, others not) that 
other people are engaging in. Id. at 1544. But because speech technologies are typically commercial and 
therefore more likely to draw scrutiny from copyright holders, one would expect that legal uncertainty 
may have a greater overdeterrence effect if copyright holders can easily threaten a lawsuit to stop 
certain technologies. 
 129. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 93, 97 (4th ed. 2004) 
(arguing that “defining simple and clear property rights” lowers transaction costs and in turn, 
“lubricates” bargaining). 
 130. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994). 
 131. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 150–51 (rev. ed. 2003); id. at 178 
(“It is simply impossible to predict with any useful degree of precision how disruptive products will be 
used or how large their markets will be.”). 
 132. Id. at xxv. 
 133. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Age: Technology Predictions Are Mostly Bunk, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 28, 2009, at A15.  
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of technologies to develop.134 Because we are unlikely to be able to predict 
the value, utility, or costs of a new speech technology to society, we should 
allow developers the leeway—or freedom to innovate—to try out many 
different possibilities in the marketplace. Moreover, this leeway should not 
simply vanish once the speech technology is launched and a copyright 
holder sues. As Tim Wu has explained, one of the biggest dangers of broad 
intellectual property rights is their capability of centralizing a hierarchical 
power over products to intellectual property holders.135 When given a 
choice between hierarchical and decentralized decisionmaking, “[i]n 
general, the economic literature strongly favors decentralized decision 
structures in economic systems, based on the observation that free-market 
economies perform better than planned, centralized economies.”136 That is 
particularly true in the context of great change or uncertainty.137 Fair use is 
thus better understood as a way to promote “decentralized decisionmaking 
in product development.”138  
Breathing room is also necessary because disruptive technologies are 
least likely to come from established firms. Christensen identified a key 
problem in how innovation is confined among established or incumbent 
firms: the “innovator’s dilemma” is that established companies and 
industries are actually limited by their own value network (which may, in 
fact, have brought them past financial success), with the effect being that 
they can be hamstrung in their ability to innovate in new or emerging 
markets.139  
The innovator’s dilemma suggests that startup technology companies 
may be an important source of innovation—indeed, Amazon, Google, 
eBay, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter were all just startups when they 
first launched their revolutionary Internet platforms and applications. 
Although some well-established tech companies like Apple and Google 
continue to innovate in entirely new areas compared with their previous 
business, startups have played a critical role in innovation in the 
 
 134. See Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 281 (2004) 
(“[N]either government nor industry monopolists are well situated to choose what technologies or firms 
the nation should use to communicate, now or in the future.”). 
 135. See Tim Wu, Essay, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. 
L. REV. 123, 126 (2006). 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 130–31. 
 138. Id. at 127. 
 139. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 131, at 61–63. See also id. at xxvi (“Companies whose 
investment processes demand quantification of market sizes and financial returns before they can enter 
a market get paralyzed or make serious mistakes when faced with disruptive technologies.”). 
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information technology and Internet sectors. Yet, despite the critical role 
startups play in innovation, they are probably the least likely to be able to 
withstand or litigate a major copyright lawsuit.140 They also may be unable 
to secure funding to keep afloat if investors view the technology as 
susceptible to a copyright lawsuit, irrespective of the actual merits of the 
copyright claim.141 This is especially true if copyright holders persist in 
aggressive attempts to expand copyright law to include “tertiary liability” 
against investors themselves.142 
The major copyright industries (such as publishing, music, and 
movies) appear particularly vulnerable to this shortcoming in handling 
innovation. Most, if not all, of these industries are not themselves typically 
in the business of developing new technologies. The business models of 
these industries have remained fairly unchanged for many years—the basic 
model is to sell and distribute books, music, and movies to the public after 
choosing or financing the works. Although the music and movie industries 
have had a few major changes in format of distribution (books less so until 
recently), those changes were driven by technologies first developed by 
others.143 As established firms with entrenched value networks whose main 
goal is to sell content, the major copyright industries are poorly positioned 
to evaluate or foster innovation in speech technologies.144  
 
 140. For example, both Napster and MP3.com went bankrupt after being sued. See supra note 53 
and accompanying text. 
 141. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 37, at 1388 (“Over and above the direct restrictions on 
innovation, the threat of lawsuits or criminal prosecutions against innovators is likely to deter a 
significant amount of innovation, some of which would unquestionably have been legal.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 142. See, e.g., In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. Cal. 2005). See 
generally Benjamin H. Glatstein, Comment, Tertiary Copyright Liability, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1605, 
1605 (2004) (examining the viability of tertiary copyright liability, explaining that “[t]ertiary liability 
reaches parties that assist a second party, but maintain no relationship with the primary party,” and 
describing tertiary copyright liability as “an action against those who help the helper”); Jessica Litman, 
Brace Memorial Lecture, War and Peace, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 13 (Fall 2005–Winter 
2006) (mentioning a lawsuit against an investor that “sent precisely the chill it was intended to into 
Silicon Valley”). 
 143. See PATRY, supra note 5, at 40–41 (mentioning online production and distribution of music 
and movies). 
 144. The Hollywood video distribution site Hulu might be a notable exception. A joint venture 
between NBC Universal and Fox, Hulu was developed in response to the disruptive technology of 
YouTube. See generally Chuck Salter, The Unlikely Mogul, FAST COMPANY, Nov. 2009, at 98 (tracing 
the development and popularity of Hulu). In fact, Hulu was dubbed the “YouTube killer.” See, e.g., 
Jessi Hempel, How Hulu Became the Season’s Hit, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2008, at 44. Hulu’s elegantly 
designed video player and exceptional video resolution have created stiff competition for YouTube in 
terms of both advertisers and viewers. See Edward Lee, Remixing Lessig, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
SOC’Y 41, 62–63 (2010). Nevertheless, YouTube, not Hulu, first led the innovation in online video. See 
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Because of the limitations of their own existing value networks, the 
major copyright industries may have a proclivity to view new technologies 
as constant threats to their business and established business plans, 
especially if the technology enables any copying of content.145 This anti-
new-technology skepticism of copyright holders dates back to the earliest 
days of copyright, from the development of the printing press to the 
phonograph.146 Under this anti-new-technology skepticism or bias, 
copyright holders view every new speech technology as a potential threat to 
their existing business model, and thus they try to stop, control, or leverage 
the new technology.147 In his latest book, copyright expert William Patry 
chronicles the many instances in which the major copyright industries have 
taken positions against new technologies.148  
Part of the problem is that copyright holders may greatly undervalue 
the social benefits that a new technology offers. As Mark Lemley and R. 
Anthony Reese explain, “Economic evidence strongly suggests that those 
unanticipated future benefits, or ‘spillover’ effects, often exceed the 
immediate value of most new technologies.”149 Sometimes, the new 
technologies foster the development of consumer activities or new markets 
that complement or add even more value to the copyright holders’ 
market.150  
One (in)famous example can be found in Hollywood’s unsuccessful 
attempt to ban the VCR—which eventually brought the movie studios their 
biggest source of revenue.151 Similarly, contrary to Hollywood studios’ 
fears, the DVR has helped, not hurt, Hollywood. As a result of DVR use, 
the total viewing of network television shows and the commercials that air 
during these shows has actually increased.152 As more DVRs sell, more 
 
Salter, supra, at 103. 
 145. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 38, at 135–36 (explaining that copyright owners have no 
incentive to innovate with new media because they would “require[] the introduction of unproven 
business models and unknown modes of copyright enforcement”); Wu, supra note 134, at 292–95 
(describing the conflict between new and existing disseminators of copyrighted content). 
 146. See PATRY, supra note 5, at xxii (recounting how the American Society of Composers, 
Authors, and Publishers “put out a pamphlet decrying the phonograph record as ‘the murderer of 
music’”); Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 320–23 (describing early English regulation 
of the printing press). 
 147. See PATRY, supra note 5, at 20–30. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Lemley & Reese, supra note 37, at 1387 (footnote omitted). 
 150. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 840–43. 
 151. See id. at 851–52. 
 152. See Bill Carter, TV Finds That Mortal Foe, DVR, Is Friend After All, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 
2009, at B1 (“According to Nielsen, 46 percent of viewers 18 to 49 years old for all four networks taken 
together are watching the commercials during playback . . . .”). 
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people are now able to watch television shows,153 and contrary to industry 
fears, a high percentage of those viewers still sit though the 
commercials.154 Likewise, YouTube—still embroiled in copyright lawsuits 
for unauthorized posting of content by YouTube users—has been used 
increasingly by Hollywood studios that have chosen to monetize such 
unauthorized postings through YouTube’s video identification program 
instead of asking for their removal.155 
This discussion is not meant in any way as a rebuke of the major 
copyright industries. They are important to the U.S. economy in their own 
right156 and have played an important part in the distribution of many 
amazing works over the years. We should not expect them to be developers 
of speech technologies. That is not their typical business.157 But precisely 
because it is not their business, we should be wary of allowing them to 
dictate or limit the ways in which new speech technologies are developed. 
The copyright industry is supposed to maximize the profits of their 
shareholders, not the overall welfare of the public. 
The copyright system is intended to maximize overall public welfare, 
however—that is, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”158 If, as the Supreme Court has already recognized, copyright law 
must afford “breathing room” to developers of speech technologies,159 the 
breathing room must give plenty of legal space for developers to develop 
those technologies without the threat of a lawsuit from copyright holders. 
And if the fair use doctrine currently lacks the kind of ex ante clarity 
needed for technological innovation,160 then courts should refine the 
doctrine accordingly. 
 
 153. This increased viewing occurs especially within three days of the original air date—the 
period measured by Nielsen ratings. See id. 
 154. See id.  
 155. Brian Stelter, Now Playing on YouTube: Clips with Ads on the Side, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 
2008, at C1 (“90 percent of the copyright claims made using the identification tool remain on the site 
and are converted to advertising inventory.”). In prior scholarship, I have identified the “hedge” 
practices of copyright holders who intentionally allow unauthorized uses of their works in order to 
benefit from such unauthorized uses. See Lee, Warming Up, supra note 128, at 1486–87. The uses, 
although unauthorized at the start, become informally accepted by the copyright holders, and further 
undermine the notion that infringement always occurs in an unauthorized use. See id. at 1486–88. 
Copyright practices must be judged over time. 
 156. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 157. Some exceptions, such as Hulu, do exist. See supra note 144. 
 158. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 159. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005). 
 160. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207, 209 (1996) (“[T]he fair-use criteria are so ambulatory that no one can give a general answer.”). 
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2.  The IT Sector’s Importance to the U.S. Economy 
Another important macroeconomic reason for recognizing 
technological fair use is that it can provide much-needed breathing room 
for innovation in one of the most important sectors of the U.S. economy 
today: information technology (“IT”). 
Although the copyright industries are important to the U.S. economy, 
they are not the only component. According to Bureau of Economic 
Analysis statistics, between 2003 and 2008, the information-
communication-technology-producing industries contributed between 3.7 
and 3.8 percentage points each year to the growth of the real Gross 
Domestic Product (“GDP”).161 By contrast, during that same period, the 
motion picture and sound recording industries contributed just 0.3 
percentage points.162 In other words, the IT sector contributed ten times 
more to U.S. real GDP growth than some of the major copyright industries 
over the same period.  
The IT sector also remained comparatively strong during the recent 
economic downturn. In 2007, “the computer and electronic products 
manufacturing industry increased 20 percent, and the information and data-
processing services industry increased 26 percent, which was more than 
any other industry.”163 Even during the most recent economic downturn, 
the information-communication-technology industries “remained strong in 
2008,” seeing a 9.0 percent increase in value added and “contribut[ing] 30 
percent to the 1.1 percent growth in real GDP,” despite comprising only 3.8 
percent of GDP.164  
These numbers indicate that any sound economic policy for the United 
States must attempt to continue to spur the growth of the IT sector. Formal 
recognition of technological fair use would be one important principle to 
serve that end. It would be foolish to cut off our IT growth to spite our 
copyright system.  
 
 
 161. See BEA, GROSS-DOMESTIC-PRODUCT-BY-INDUSTRY ACCOUNTS (2009), available at 
http://www.bea.gov/industry/gpotables/gpo_action.cfm?anon=506869&table_id=24753&format_type=
0. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Soo Jeong Kim et al., Annual Industry Accounts: Revised Statistics for 2005–2007, SURV. 
CURRENT BUS., Dec. 2008, at 21, 21–22, available at http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2008/12December/ 
1208_indyaccts.pdf. 
 164. Manufacturing Industries Led Slowdown in 2008: Advance Gross Domestic Product by 
Industry, 2008, BEA, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/industry/gdpindustry/2009/ 
gdpind08.htm. 
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3.  A Response to Gordon’s Market Failure Theory of Fair Use 
My economic argument in favor of technological fair use does not 
depend on the existence of market failure. This is a key criterion in Wendy 
Gordon’s influential market failure approach to fair use, which examines 
whether “(1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is 
socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial 
injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner.”165 When first 
proposed, Gordon viewed all three factors as necessary before a fair use 
should be recognized.166 With respect to new technologies, Gordon advised 
courts to take a cautious approach before recognizing fair use so that, over 
time, market mechanisms could develop, thereby enabling copyright 
holders eventually to exact licensing of their works for use in new 
technologies.167 “If copyright protection is denied because of an otherwise 
curable market failure, then the additional revenues that would have flowed 
[to the copyright holders] from the new technological use will not 
appear.”168 
Gordon’s influential article has elicited a wealth of commentary over 
the years,169 including a more recent article from Gordon backtracking 
somewhat from her original argument.170 It goes beyond this Article’s 
scope to canvas or critique all of the rich literature related to Gordon’s 
theory. Instead, I would like to focus on why Gordon’s market failure test 
is inadequate to deal with technological fair use cases. Although I believe 
market failure can be a factor for consideration, it should not supplant the 
balance of factors, or become the be-all, end-all of fair use. 
Part of the problem with the market failure test is that it runs the risk 
of giving copyright industries too much (unwarranted) control over 
 
 165. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982). 
 166. Id. at 1620–21 (“[T]he courts should limit their grants of fair use to those occasions in which 
the market cannot be relied upon to allow socially beneficial uses to occur.”). 
 167. Id. at 1621–22. Paul Goldstein goes one step further in suggesting that copyright law should 
generally extend to new technological uses (though he is skeptical of the courts’ ability to handle this 
issue). See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 35, at 188–89, 199–200. At times, Gordon appears to be a little more 
sanguine about allowing fair use for new technologies because, at least in the beginning, high 
transaction costs might hamper the ability of users to negotiate licenses from copyright holders. See 
Gordon, supra note 165, at 1628–29. 
 168. Gordon, supra note 165, at 1621. 
 169. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 975 (2002).  
 170. See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs 
Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 153–56 (2003). 
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emerging technologies. The test views the relevant market as simply the 
market for the copyrighted work, but it ignores the emerging market for the 
new technology. Whether copyright holders can license their works cannot 
answer the question of whether an emerging market for a new technology 
might develop better without such licenses or control by copyright holders. 
Under a more informed approach, the ability to obtain copyright licenses is 
a relevant consideration, but so is whether fair use can help foster 
technological innovation in a new or incipient market. 
Although I have offered economic justifications for technological fair 
use, the doctrine is, in the end, much more than that. The biggest flaw in 
transforming fair use into a market failure test is that fair use is a First 
Amendment safeguard, not some economic indicator. Under our First 
Amendment jurisprudence, we do not use the market to decide whether 
speech or a speech technology is permissible. Instead, the Constitution 
values speech and technologies that facilitate expression in a different way 
than the market does.171 Gordon conceded as much:  
 Distrust of the market may also be triggered when the defendant’s 
activities involve social values that are not easily monetized. When the 
defendant’s use contributes something of importance to public 
knowledge, political debate, or human health, it may be difficult to state 
the social worth of that contribution as a dollar figure. If the defendant’s 
interest impinges on a first amendment interest, relying upon the market 
may become particularly inappropriate; constitutional values are rarely 
well paid in the marketplace and, while the citizenry would no doubt be 
willing to pay to avoid losing such values, it is awkward at best to try to 
put a “price” on them. Not surprisingly, it has been suggested that fair 
use be granted when first amendment issues are involved.172 
However, Gordon’s theory failed to recognize how speech technologies 
implicate this First Amendment concern.173 
To reduce fair use into a simple market failure test would strip the 
doctrine of its traditional role as a First Amendment safeguard. There 
would be little, if any, breathing room for speech technologies. If, as 
 
 171. Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 386–87.  
 172. Gordon, supra note 165, at 1631–32 (footnotes omitted). 
 173. Gordon advised that “‘public interest’ cannot provide a justification for fair use unless there 
is a reason to believe that the market cannot be relied upon to serve that interest.” Id. at 1636. In her 
more recent writing, Gordon has admitted that some situations might involve “inherent limitation[s]” 
that are entirely inappropriate for market-based norms, such as treating babies as commodities. See 
Gordon, supra note 170, at 152. Gordon also recognized that “where non-economic values are at stake, 
we might feel very uneasy trusting that market transactions could achieve the desired goals” and, 
accordingly, “even if market conditions were perfect, it would be normatively appropriate to proceed 
outside the market’s ordinary process of consent and payment.” Id. at 160. 
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Gordon originally proposed, courts should defer to the market and the 
eventual development of licensing mechanisms, technology developers 
could expect to have to seek a license for every new use of a work, even if 
no practicable licensing mechanism presently exists. Faced with that 
prospect, technology companies and developers might stop investing in 
research and development for speech technologies and devote their 
resources elsewhere. Gordon’s theory seems to overlook this prospect 
because it focuses heavily on licensing to users of works but not to the 
developers of speech technologies.174  
The market failure approach may produce another troubling situation 
in technological fair use cases: entanglement between copyright holders 
and how speech technologies are designed. The market failure approach 
places a premium on negotiation with copyright holders for licensing uses 
of their works.175 Some copyright industries may seek to dictate not just 
uses of their works, but also the design features of new technologies, as 
was the case with Sony,176 and more recently with TiVo,177 ReplayTV,178 
Cablevision and other DVR manufacturers,179 as well as Amazon’s 
Kindle.180 Innovative technological features may often be sacrificed by 
technology companies to avoid—or buy off—potentially unmeritorious but 
costly lawsuits. Given this past history, the goal of certain copyright 
industries sometimes appears to be not to license their works but to shut 
down a technology or new functionality that may have valuable social 
benefits but to which they object. 
Whatever the strategy of copyright holders, their entanglement with 
 
 174. See Gordon, supra note 165, at 1621. 
 175. See id. at 1629–30. Although Gordon recognizes other forms of market failure, her 
discussion of new technologies focuses on allowing the opportunity for copyright holders to develop 
market mechanisms to license their works. See id. at 1621. 
 176. See PATRY, supra note 5, at 150–51 (describing how movie studios tried to get Sony to adopt 
their DiscoVision, which did not allow recording, in lieu of Sony’s Betamax, which did). 
 177. See Hyangsun Lee, The Audio Broadcast Flag System—Can It Be a Solution?, 12 COMM. L. 
& POL’Y 405, 465–66 (2007) (discussing how TiVo dropped its portable TiVoToGo feature, which 
enabled recorded content to be portable, after pressure from the Hollywood industry). 
 178. See Lemley, supra note 38, at 150–54 (discussing copyright lawsuits against ReplayTV’s 
“Send Show,” “AutoSkip,” and “Library” features). See also Eric A. Taub, ReplayTV’s New Owners 
Drop Features That Riled Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at C3 (explaining that ReplayTV 
stopped offering the first two of these functions to its users in response to pressures from the 
entertainment industry). 
 179. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(denying copyright claim against Cablevision’s remote storage DVR). 
 180. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing how Amazon decided to give copyright 
holders the option to disable the Kindle’s text-to-speech feature).  
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how speech technologies are designed is troubling from a First Amendment 
perspective. The history of abuses in England in allowing the Stationers’ 
Company, the de facto copyright holders, to control the printing press was 
precisely what led to the recognition of the freedom of the press, first in 
England and then in the United States.181 Thus, copyright holders’ control 
over speech technologies raises serious constitutional red flags. 
IV.  FAIR USE TAILORED TO TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE 
CLAIMS 
One of the most difficult questions in all of copyright is how to 
determine if a new technological use of copyrighted works should be 
assimilated into the copyright holder’s exclusive rights. For over two 
centuries of our copyright law’s existence, this question has recurred—
from the pianola and record player to the camera, radio, cable television, 
copy machine, VCR, and Internet. Much like the mythical hydra, the 
question rears its several heads over copyright law without end—tackle one 
difficult technology, and another one pops up. Scholars who prefer strong 
copyright protection, such as Paul Goldstein, advocate for a general policy 
of assimilating all or most new technological uses of copyrighted works 
into the copyright holder’s rights.182 However, this view is hard to square 
with past copyright decisions, which over the years have resulted in a much 
more varied—and permissive—approach to new technological uses.183 
More importantly, it is harder to square with the goals of the First 
Amendment and the Copyright and Patent Clause, which, as explained 
above in Part III, are meant to provide breathing room for the development 
of speech technologies. By the same token, the opposite approach—
assimilating all new technological uses as fair uses or exemptions from 
copyright—would be equally hard to justify, as it would threaten to shrink 
copyright as innovation continues to progress and new uses eventually 
replace old ones. 
The better approach lies somewhere in between these two extremes. 
Copyright must allow breathing room for the development of speech 
technologies but without immoderately shrinking copyright protections.184 
 
 181. See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 182. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 35, at 188–89, 199–200. 
 183. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1616 (2001) (“Indeed, a review of past confrontations between copyright and 
new technological means of dissemination suggests that courts often are reluctant to restrain the public 
availability of new technologies, even when those technologies appear principally designed to exploit 
copyrighted works.” (footnote omitted)). 
 184. Although this Article focuses on fair use, the issue is not simply a choice between fair use or 
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The hard task is separating the wheat from the chaff.185 This part offers a 
framework to assist courts in that endeavor.  
A.  A PROPOSAL FOR COURTS 
My basic proposal is that courts recognize a discrete category of 
technological fair use. Although fair use remains a case-by-case inquiry, 
the four factors can be tailored more specifically to address recurring issues 
raised by speech technologies, similar to how the Supreme Court tailored 
the factors for parodies in Campbell.186 Even though parody is not an 
express purpose of fair use listed in § 107, courts have correctly identified 
it as a legitimate type of fair use.187 Likewise, courts should identify 
technological fair use as a legitimate type of fair use. 
Of course, the tailoring of the factors for new speech technologies 
does not mean that the presence of a new technology automatically 
warrants a finding of fair use. The factors must still be applied in each case. 
As an “equitable rule of reason,”188 the factors must be balanced and 
weighed by the judge(s) or jury, so it is unrealistic to expect that my 
proposal will yield clear, indisputable outcomes like a mathematical 
formula. Instead, I hope to offer the right set of questions for courts to ask 
when analyzing fair use, so courts can better appreciate what is at stake.189 
Before getting to my framework, one legal distinction is worth noting: 
the difference between direct and secondary liability. Even though different 
legal standards apply, my framework is relevant for both claims. A direct 
liability claim alleges that the developer itself has violated at least one of 
 
infringement. A court may rule that none of the exclusive rights of copyright has even been violated, 
thereby obviating the need for analyzing fair use. See infra notes 366–67 and accompanying text. 
 185. It goes beyond this Article’s scope to critique the few previous proposals on this topic. For 
these proposals, see, for example, Lemley, supra note 38, at 157–62 (proposing an “innovative medium 
defense” to protect developers); Timberg, supra note 36, at 226–40 (proposing a bifurcated approach 
that recognizes a broad right of fair use for copyrighted works and providing compensation to copyright 
holders in some appropriate cases of economic injury); Unified Theory, supra note 36, at 460–68 
(proposing a normative framework encompassing interaction-iteration and noncommercial-commercial 
factors). Von Lohmann stops short of a proposal, but argues in favor of applying fair use more 
generously to allow “private copying” technologies. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 861–64. 
 186. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–94 (1994). 
 187. See, e.g., id. at 579–80; Lebovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 
1998) (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. 569). 
 188. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984). 
 189. Given the speed at which technologies change today, it would be unwise to devise any test or 
rule that did not have flexibility to accommodate new technologies and unforeseen developments. See 
Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1332–33 (2002) 
(describing some of the difficulties posed by rapid technological change). 
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the exclusive rights of copyright, whereas a secondary liability claim 
alleges that users of a technology have so violated a right and that the 
developer should also be held liable.190 Fair use is a defense to direct 
liability.191 But because secondary liability requires proof of direct 
infringement,192 fair use is also relevant to secondary claims. In addition, 
fair use is relevant to the Sony safe harbor, which protects technology 
developers from secondary liability for technologies that have substantial 
noninfringing uses, such as a fair use.193 Accordingly, although the 
distinction between direct and secondary liability is important in deciding 
infringement claims, the legal standard of fair use is the same in either 
situation.194 My proposal for technological fair use applies to both kinds of 
claims.  
My proposal for analyzing technological fair use is summarized in 
table 1 below. A fuller explanation of each fair use factor follows.  
 
 190. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining the categories of 
liability as “direct copyright infringement, contributory and vicarious copyright infringement”). 
 191. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 192. See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1076 (explaining the elements of contributory and vicarious 
copyright infringement). 
 193. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. Given the Sony safe harbor, a developer may 
have greater protection against secondary liability than direct liability.  
 194. Often, the strategy of copyright holders is to sue the technology developer instead of the user, 
so even in secondary liability cases the developer may be the one asserting fair use on behalf of its 
users. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (considering 
claims that time-shifting recording of television shows by VCR users constituted fair use). 
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TABLE 1.  Framework for Analyzing Technological Fair Use 
Factor One: 
(a)   Is the use of the copyrighted work for a new or value-adding purpose of 
creating, operating, or providing output of a speech technology or 
application? 
(b)   If so, can a potential public benefit from the technology be reasonably 
perceived? 
(c)   Identify if the use is for creating, operating, or providing output of the 
technology and give more leeway to creational/operational use. 
(d)   Give less weight to the commerciality of the use unless the technology is 
offered at a high fee (this may cut against fair use). Some weight is 
accorded to free technologies (this may cut in favor of fair use). 
Factor Two: 
The nature of the copyrighted work has less weight. 
Factor Three: 
Evaluate the amount/substantiality of the copying in light of the purpose 
measured by factor one and along the Creation-Operation-Output spectrum. 
Factor Four: 
Evaluate the effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work (and 
derivatives) and the effect on the potential market for the speech 
technology. 
1.  Factor One: Purpose and Character of Use of the Copyrighted Work 
Analyzed Under the Creation-Operation-Output Spectrum 
Factor one of fair use is “the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes.”195 In his empirical study of fair use cases, Barton 
Beebe found a strong correlation between factor one and the outcomes in 
fair use cases: “Indeed, 95.3% of the 148 opinions that found that factor 
one disfavored fair use eventually found no fair use, while 90.2% of the 
opinions that found that the factor favored fair use eventually found fair 
use.”196 If factor one usually determines or coincides with the outcome in 
practice, then it is important to tailor this factor with enough detail for 
courts to ask the right questions in technological fair use cases. 
Accordingly, I have broken down factor one into four related 
 
 195. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
 196. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 597 (2008). 
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considerations. 
a.  New or Value-Adding (Transformative) Purpose: Is the Use for the 
Purpose or Function of Creating, Operating, or Providing an Output of a 
Technology or Application? 
A court should first examine whether the use of a copyrighted work is 
for a new or value-adding purpose of creating, operating, or providing an 
output of a speech technology or application. If it is not, no claim of 
technological fair use is present, and the court should proceed to analyze 
the case under the ordinary standard for fair use. However, if it does 
contain such a purpose, this factor weighs in favor of technological fair 
use—though, in varying degrees and with the rest of the factors still to be 
considered. 
Some courts have called this kind of purpose a “transformative” 
purpose.197 The terminology has produced a considerable amount of 
criticism and confusion.198 The confusion stems from use of 
“transformative” to mean different things, depending on whether it 
modifies “use” or “purpose.”199 When modifying “use,” transformative 
describes what is commonly known as a “productive” use, meaning that the 
defendant has used the copyrighted work to produce a new work, such as a 
parody of a copyrighted work.200 But when modifying “purpose,” courts 
have used “transformative” to describe situations without productive uses 
where the copyrighted work is copied verbatim, sometimes in its entirety; 
the transformation—or something new—arises in the purpose of using the 
work, such as in a technology with a new function in how the work is 
used.201  
If courts were starting from scratch, perhaps they would be better 
served by avoiding the use of the word “transformative” to describe both 
purposes and uses under fair use. However, because courts already have 
used this terminology in technological fair use cases, I will continue to do 
 
 197. See, e.g., A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 198. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 449 (2008) (arguing that transformativeness should not be treated as a 
binary concept but rather interpreted as a matter of degree—“the amount of interpretive distance that 
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work creates”); Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: 
Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497 (2008) (arguing that noncommercial 
production can signal a transformative purpose); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things 
Change, the Less They Seem “Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 251 (1998) (explaining how transformativeness is both over- and underinclusive). 
 199. The terms “use” and “purpose” appear in § 107(1). 
 200. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994). 
 201. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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so for ease of incorporation of my framework into existing doctrine. 
However, my theory does not depend on whether “transformative purpose” 
is accepted. I am happy to substitute “new or value-adding” purpose 
instead. 
This approach is consistent with the text of the fair use provision. The 
Copyright Act expressly includes both the “purpose” and “character of the 
use” as relevant considerations,202 which trace back to Justice Story’s idea 
of looking to the “objects” and “nature” of the use in the precursor to the 
fair use doctrine.203 In addition, the basic exemption of fair use in the first 
sentence of § 107 lists several different “purposes” of fair use.204 Thus, as a 
textual matter, the purpose of the use is an express factor for consideration 
under the Copyright Act. As the Supreme Court stated in Campbell, 
“transformative” means that it “adds something new,” which has “a further 
purpose or different character.”205 The Court’s use of the “or” indicates two 
different alternatives: purpose or character. In addition, the phrase 
“supersede[s] the objects” of the original creation focuses on the purposes 
of the original creation.206  
In sum, the important consideration of factor one is that courts ask 
whether the use of a copyrighted work is for a new or value-adding purpose 
of creating, operating, or providing output of a technology or application. If 
so, the fair use analysis should be tailored for technological fair uses. 
b.  Public Benefit: Can One Reasonably Perceive a Potential Public 
Benefit from the Technology or Application? 
Next, the court asks whether one can reasonably perceive a potential 
public benefit from the technology in question. Fair use has traditionally 
 
 202. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 203. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
 204. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, 
[and] research”). 
 205. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 572, 579 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 206. Id. (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348). True, the 
Court’s reference to “the new work” might indicate a limitation to productive fair uses. Id. However, 
the Court’s phrase “altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message” seems broad enough to 
encompass the “new meaning” of copyrighted works in some technological fair use cases (for example, 
within antiplagiarism software, the underlying works have the “new meaning” of data for a computer to 
detect cheating or plagiarism in schools). Id. Although the Court noted “[t]he obvious statutory 
exception to this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for 
classroom distribution,” the Court here specified transformative uses, not purposes. Id. at 579 n.11. In 
the end, the Court’s analysis of transformative purpose is ambiguous—which may explain the 
confusion in the lower courts. 
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included a consideration of public benefit,207and a number of courts that 
have considered technological fair use claims have done so as well, perhaps 
even more prominently.208 
So what exactly is a public benefit? It is probably unwise to attempt to 
define precisely the term, given the myriad of potential circumstances that 
arise under fair use. But the basic idea in this context is that the technology 
in question has societal value in some way for the public at large, not just 
for the technology developer or, for that matter, the copyright industries. 
Because of the Copyright and Patent Clause’s limitation of promoting the 
progress of science and useful arts, our copyright and patent laws have 
always placed the goal of serving the public above individual private 
interest as the ultimate goal of both systems.209 Accordingly, the fair use 
doctrine has always had an overriding goal of serving the public by acting 
as a First Amendment safeguard within copyright law and as a doctrine to 
promote the progress of science.210 Indeed, there would be no need for the 
fair use doctrine at all if the public were deemed irrelevant to copyright 
law’s scope. In economic terms, analyzing whether a public benefit is 
derived from a new technology or application can help to identify the 
positive externalities of a technology.211  
The more difficult question is whether the court should attempt to 
weigh or valuate the extent of the public benefit that is derived or likely to 
be derived from the new technology. And if so, should the court then 
attempt to balance the public benefit against any potential cognizable harm 
to the copyright holder and its traditional market? The law-and-economics 
school might favor such an approach, which resembles a cost-benefit 
analysis of sorts. Moreover, the general test of fair use is one in which the 
 
 207. See Latman, supra note 58, at 7 (“[A]s a condition of obtaining the statutory grant, the author 
is deemed to consent to certain reasonable uses of his copyrighted work to promote the ends of public 
welfare for which he was granted copyright.”). See also, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Like less 
ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, [parody] can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an 
earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (“The District Court’s conclusions are buttressed by the fact that to the 
extent time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal 
benefits.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721–22 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 209. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. See generally Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing 
Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (2003) (offering a critical review of our copyright system’s 
effectiveness in serving the public). 
 210. See supra Part III.A. 
 211. See Gordon, supra note 165, at 1630 (“When a defendant’s works yield such ‘external 
benefits,’ the market cannot be relied upon as a mechanism for facilitating socially desirable 
transactions.” (footnote omitted)). 
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“factors are all weighed in the ‘equitable rule of reason’ balance.”212  
In my view, however, courts should not get in the business of trying to 
valuate the potential public benefit derived from a new technology or 
perform a straight-out cost-benefit analysis in determining fair use. First, it 
is beyond judicial competence to attempt to quantify or measure, with any 
specificity, the public benefit that might accrue from a new technology. 
New technologies are often unpredictable; their most significant and lasting 
benefits are often unforeseen when first introduced.213 Second, even law-
and-economics scholars have conceded that economic analysis of 
intellectual property is often “inconclusive, if not indeterminate.”214 
Finally, trying to compare the value or benefit of a speech technology to 
what harm might impact the copyright holder’s market is doomed to failure 
because the two factors are simply incommensurable. Because of the First 
Amendment, we value speech and speech technologies in a much different 
way than dollars.215 Even law-and-economics scholars concede that cost-
benefit analysis is unable to evaluate rights or nonwelfare values.216  
So how, then, should a court judge a public benefit? To borrow the 
Court’s standard in parody cases, I think courts should determine whether a 
public benefit from the technology “may reasonably be perceived.”217 If so, 
 
 212. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454. 
 213. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 131, at 131; Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 
403 (“Courts are neither technologists nor good predictors of innovation or new technologies.”); R. 
Anthony Reese, The Problems of Judging Young Technologies: A Comment on Sony, Tort Doctrines, 
and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 877, 887 (2005) (discussing how courts “are 
unlikely to be able to quantify a technology’s actual costs and benefits, or perhaps even their relative 
magnitudes, with any degree of certainty”). Internet-related technologies are especially difficult to 
predict given how rapidly they evolve. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 671 (2004) (discussing the 
problems of fact-finding in Internet cases, given that “[t]he technology of the Internet evolves at a rapid 
pace”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (commenting on how the Internet’s communication 
and information retrieval methods are “constantly evolving”). 
 214. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 10 (2003) (noting “[t]he complexity of the subject and the degree to 
which economic analysis of intellectual property remains inconclusive, if not indeterminate” (footnote 
omitted)). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
103, 104 (1999) (arguing that “[i]gnorance [in the economic analysis of intellectual property] thus 
should lead us to leave well enough alone”); David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 
MO. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (criticizing the consequentialist rhetoric in copyright law that leads to a “legal 
endgame” in which “[w]hoever has to prove the unprovable facts is likely to lose”). 
 215. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 831 
(1994) (“If we value speech either as an intrinsic good or because it is instrumental to a well-
functioning deliberative process, we will value it in a quite different way from toasters.”). 
 216. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 154–62 (2006). 
 217. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994). 
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then this part of the analysis favors fair use. If not, the analysis here is 
either neutral or militates against fair use. 
The “reasonably perceived” standard is meant to be a low threshold, 
an approach consistent with providing breathing room for developers and 
allowing new technologies to evolve. This approach also avoids putting 
judges in the position of evaluating the value of speech technologies, which 
might, in itself, raise First Amendment problems. As the Campbell Court 
noted, the reasonably perceived standard is analogous to the judicial 
nondiscrimination principle articulated by Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co.—a principle that keeps judges from 
evaluating the artistic merit or worth of copyrighted works “outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits.”218 In addition, Judge Posner has 
explained that “the fair-use doctrine is not intended to set up the courts as 
judges of the quality of expressive works” under copyright law because it 
“would be an unreasonable burden to place on judges, as well as raising a 
First Amendment question.”219 For similar reasons, I believe we should 
avoid having courts attempt to evaluate the value of different speech 
technologies. Judges should not be asked to discriminate among speech or 
speech technologies “outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”220 
The reasonably perceived standard for finding a public benefit in a speech 
technology is all that we should expect, and allow, from judges.221  
That is not to say the court must disregard the potential scale of the 
public benefit that may be derived. Some technologies may be pioneer 
inventions that have the potential to transform society in immensely 
beneficial ways, whereas other technologies may be more incremental in 
effect. For example, the Internet is more revolutionary today than eight-
track tapes ever were. The Court in Sony did consider the potential size of 
the public benefit of the VCR, but only in a general way and not in direct 
comparison to the potential harm to the copyright holders.222 Simply citing 
a past case, the Court concluded that greater access to free broadcast 
 
 218. Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)). 
 219. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 523 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 220. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582.  
 221. It is interesting to note the Court’s comparable deferential approach to government takings of 
property for “public use”—asking whether or not the governmental plan serves a “public purpose.” See 
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (interpreting permissible “public use” under the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The standard for the takings doctrine adopts a broad approach 
to “public.” Id.  
 222. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (“One may 
search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of millions of people who 
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have 
enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible.”). 
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programs was in the public interest, but without attempting to put a value 
on that interest.223 Although the Sony Court did not use a reasonably 
perceived standard, its relaxed standard for recognizing a public benefit is 
consistent with this approach. Additionally, a similarly relaxed approach to 
finding a public benefit has been applied in some of the other technological 
fair use cases discussed above.224 
Some may object that my low threshold for finding a public benefit 
may mean that every speech technology developed will have a plus factor 
in favor of fair use. Perhaps, but one can imagine that certain technologies 
that might fail the Sony safe harbor (for example, because they do not have 
a substantial noninfringing use at all) will be deemed to lack a public 
benefit. Also, a technology that was used privately and not shared with 
others might be found to lack a public benefit. In any event, even if most 
speech technologies do have a public benefit, that is a consequence, I 
believe, of the First Amendment and how much the Constitution values 
speech technologies. 
c.  Superseding Use Analyzed Along the Creation-Operation-Output 
Spectrum  
After a court has determined the threshold question of whether the 
technology in question has a new or value-adding purpose that provides a 
potential public benefit, the court should then ask whether the use of the 
copyrighted work supersedes the purposes of the original work. This 
inquiry dovetails somewhat with factor four of fair use—effect on the 
copyright holder’s market (discussed below). It is also the flipside of the 
“transformative” factor that asks whether the use of the copyrighted work 
“merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation” instead of 
adding new value or purpose to it.225 By definition, using a copyrighted 
work in a highly transformative manner is more likely to be 
nonsuperseding.  
 
 223. Id. at 454 (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972)). 
 224. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] 
search engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a new work, namely, an 
electronic reference tool.”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
the use of images for a visual search “benefit[ed] the public by enhancing information-gathering 
techniques on the internet”); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“Public benefit need not be direct or tangible, but may arise because the challenged use serves a public 
interest.” (citation omitted)); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1119 (D. Nev. 2006) 
(commenting that Google’s cache functionality “serves different and socially important purposes in 
offering access to copyrighted works”). 
 225. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841)). 
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In analyzing superseding use in a technological fair use case, one of 
the key determinations is to identify the stage(s) of the technology’s 
development during which the claimed fair use is made—(1) creation, 
(2) operation, or (3) output. Developers should have more leeway or 
breathing room, on average, during the creation and operation stages than 
during the output stage. Although technological fair uses can occur at the 
output stage, as with home recordings on the VCR in Sony, the output 
analysis may raise greater concerns about potential superseding uses that 
approximate one of the copyright holder’s exclusive rights or traditional 
markets. As depicted below in table 2, the Creation-Operation-Output 
categories represent a spectrum. 
 
TABLE 2.  Creation-Operation-Output Spectrum 
 
Creational Uses                            Operational Uses                           Output Uses 
 
Greater Leeway                                                                                  Less Leeway 
   for Fair Use                                                                                      for Fair Use 
Creational uses, meaning uses of a copyrighted work simply to create 
a technology, without more, are probably the least likely to be superseding. 
The reason is that uses of copyrighted works solely at the creation stage of 
a technology—during the process of creating the technology—are more 
likely to be purely functional uses necessary to creating the new 
technology. As such, creational uses fall within the subject matter of patent, 
not copyright, if protection is sought. Sega provides an example of a purely 
creational use. Copies of Sega’s operating system were made only during 
the reverse engineering stage to identify functional (and unpatented and 
uncopyrightable) elements of the program.226 The functional elements were 
then used to create a new application that could work on Sega’s 
machine.227 The defendant’s copies of Sega’s copyrighted program were in 
this sense only “intermediate,” as the court noted, because they were never 
used beyond the reverse engineering and creation stage.228 No copies were 
 
 226. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514–16. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1518. Intermediate copies used to create a new technology are distinguishable from 
interim copies of copyrighted works that are just used in the process of making the final copy. Cf. Walt 
Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 876 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (materials created were 
interim copies of film to be used in final production). As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Sega, a key 
difference is that the former involves intermediate copying to deal with functional items not within the 
scope of copyright but necessary to create a new technology or application. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1518–
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later used in operating the defendant’s game or as an output to end users.229 
Operational uses of copyrighted works in technologies fall near the 
middle of the spectrum, but in terms of having a lower potential of 
superseding the copyrighted work, fall closer to the side of creational uses. 
This is so because a purely operational use of copyrighted works, without 
any output of the works to the end user, is more likely to be a functional 
use of the work—meaning here that they function as a part of the operation 
of the technology. Operational uses are different from creational uses in 
that operational uses occur during the operation of the technology once it 
has already been created.230 For example, the VCR can record shows from 
televisions during operation. Because operational uses typically occur with 
some output to the end user (such as how, after recording, the VCR’s 
output is a taped program), it is difficult to find uses that are purely 
operational, where the only use of a copyrighted work is made internally 
within the machine. One example is the creation of temporary copies of 
materials as they are transmitted through various parts—or the “pipes”—of 
the Internet. This example involves a purely operational use if the parts of 
the Internet through which material is transmitted do not involve the output 
of the content to the end users.231 Another simplified example of a purely 
 
19. 
 229. Purely creational uses are somewhat difficult to find outside of reverse engineering. 
Typically, a copyrighted work is also used during the operation and output of the technology, such as 
with the finding and displaying of content through search engines. However, one hypothetical example 
of a purely creational use would be using copyrighted works—such as an encyclopedia—to increase the 
knowledge of a computer programmed with artificial intelligence. If the computer simply “learned” 
from the works, without continual access to them in a database, such a use would be purely creational—
giving the computer artificial intelligence. 
 230. Some examples may straddle the line. For example, search engines and antiplagiarism 
software continually add to their databases even after their technologies have been created. See, e.g., 
Turnitin, The WriteCycle Collaborative Writing Solution, http://turnitin.com/static/products.html (last 
visited May 1, 2010) (discussing antiplagiarism system’s “continuously updated databases”); How 
Search Engines Work, SEARCHENGINEWATCH.COM, Mar. 14, 2007, http://searchenginewatch.com/ 
2168031 (discussing the continual updating of search engines through “crawling” of Web pages). 
Google created its search engine more than a decage ago, but it continues to add to its database by 
automated software copying of Web pages. See Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a 
Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 30 COMPUTER NETWORKS & ISDN SYS. 107 (April 
1998), available at http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html (discussing Google’s system and 
the need to “crawl” millions of Web pages for indexing). Is such copying creational or operational? An 
argument can be made either way. However, I would categorize such copying as still creational in that 
it continues to create the database to update the technology. By contrast, I prefer to use the term 
operational for uses by the end users of the technology; such operational uses do not alter the 
technology itself. 
 231. That is why operational uses of copyrighted works in computers and the Internet have often 
been exempted or considered noninfringing. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006) (excluding from liability 
instances when the owner of a copy of a computer program makes or authorizes the making of another 
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operational use is the processing of copyrighted materials in a paper 
shredder or recycling plant.232 Copyrighted and other materials are 
destroyed or recycled during operation of the technology, but it does not 
provide output of copyrighted materials to end users. As a general matter, 
greater leeway should be afforded to operational use.  
Output uses fall on the other end of the spectrum and may raise greater 
concern of a superseding use. Because an output use often results in some 
distribution, display, or performance of the copyrighted work to the public, 
such output may run the risk of superseding the traditional purposes of the 
copyright holder’s rights in marketing the work to the public. Making 
photocopies on a copier is an example of an output use. The machine 
produces the output of copies, some of which may come from copyrighted 
works. So too is the transmission of content over the radio and over cable 
and broadcast television. Such transmissions are output uses of the content 
to the public (there are also operational uses to the extent the content must 
be transmitted through the technology from one location to another by 
broadcast, cable, or other conduit). Technologies whose purpose is to 
disseminate content are likely to involve output uses of copyrighted works. 
Although my sliding scale still affords some leeway for output uses of 
copyrighted works, it is less so, on average, when compared to the other 
two types of uses.  
Sometimes, perhaps even often, cases may involve some combination 
of creational, operational, or output uses of copyrighted works. In such 
cases, courts must be careful to identify the stages at which the various uses 
 
copy as long as the copy is created “as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program”); id. 
§ 512 (The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) safe harbors for passive conduits, caching, 
storage, and locator tools). See also Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 
131 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In determining who actually ‘makes’ a copy, a significant difference exists 
between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to 
make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and 
engages in no volitional conduct.”); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 
F. Supp. 1361, 1369–70 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that the doctrine of “volition” denies direct 
infringement liability against technology developers for merely “designing or implementing a system 
that automatically and uniformly creates temporary copies of all data sent through it”). The operational 
use doctrine may also apply to DMCA safe harbors, thereby allowing certain automated uses of the 
copyrighted works to still fall within the safe harbor. See, e.g., Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 
586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that automated conversion of video files and preview 
images by a service provider did not disqualify it from a DMCA § 512(c) safe harbor). 
 232. This example may seem far fetched as a copyright issue. However, some arguments have 
been made for extending the continental European notion of moral right of integrity to encompass the 
destruction of copyrighted works. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better Than 
Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 662–64 (2008) (describing the state of 
authors’ moral rights). 
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occur and analyze each stage along the spectrum according the appropriate 
level of breathing room for each stage. For example, in the “thumbnail” 
search engine cases such as Kelly, the developers created, as part of a new 
search engine, a database of copied photographs in thumbnail size that 
were later copied again and displayed on the screens of Internet users 
operating the search engine, resulting in an output of the photographs only 
in thumbnail size.233  
Although my proposal of the Creation-Operation-Output spectrum 
does not provide formulaic certainty, it does provide greater clarity 
regarding how technological fair use cases should be judged, in a way that 
balances the competing interests of copyright holders, technology 
developers, and the public. My approach is also fairly consistent with the 
outcomes in successful technological fair use cases, as table 3 below 
depicts—which suggests that my framework and Creation-Operation-
Output spectrum can be easily incorporated into existing case law. 
 
TABLE 3.  Summary of Successful Technological Fair Use Cases 
Creational Uses                           Operational Uses                           Output Uses 
None Sony recording      
(verbatim copies) 
Sony (verbatim copies) 








Kelly image search 
engine (verbatim copies) 
















All of the fair use cases with creational uses involved verbatim 
copying of the entirety of the works. Likewise, all the operational uses 
involving copies had either verbatim or more limited copies. Only Sony 
involved the output of verbatim copies of the entire original works, albeit 
 
 233. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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for the noncommercial home use of time-shifting.234 Otherwise, all of the 
cases had outputs that were more limited in some way (for example, size, 
quality, time, and quantity) than the entirety of the original works.235  
Moreover, the Kelly–Google search engine cases and the A.V.-
antiplagiarism case all involve a similar pattern of use: (1) verbatim copies 
of copyrighted works in their entirety at creation in order to create a 
database, (2) verbatim or more limited copies of relevant works during 
operation and use of the database, but (3) a more limited output of the 
works to the user or public. The visual search engine provided outputs of 
thumbnail images in reduced size and quality;236 the caching search engine, 
only a temporary static snapshot of the website;237 and the antiplagiarism 
software, only the relevant passages that might have been plagiarized in the 
student’s work.238 The patterns in these cases support my theory that, as a 
rough (but not hard-and-fast) guide, fair use should afford more leeway to 
developers at the creation and operation stages. 
Likewise, as table 4 below depicts, the unsuccessful technological fair 
use cases involved outputs that offered 100 percent of the original work or 
a permanent copy of an entire derivative work to the public. The more 
doubtful questions of technological fair use occur in these verbatim output 
 
 234. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Although there 
has been much debate over whether building a library of recorded shows is infringing, the Court in 
Grokster indicated that such activity was not necessarily infringing. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931 (2005) (noting that “[a]lthough Sony’s advertisements urged 
consumers to buy the VCR to . . . ‘build a library’ of recorded programs, [this use was not] necessarily 
infringing” (citation omitted)). This suggestion repudiated Judge Posner’s view that library building is 
“unquestionably infringing.” In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 235. The Galoob case was somewhat unique in that it involved the ability to alter temporarily the 
display of video game features, but not permanently in any fixed copy; in that sense, it was more 
limited. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992). The 
legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 appears to contemplate that the right to make derivative 
works may be violated even without a fixed copy. See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 58 (1975), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675 (“[The right to make a derivative work] is broader than that right [to 
copy] . . . in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the 
preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomi[m]e, or improvised performance, may be an 
infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.”). But the Senate report then went on 
to state:  
[T]o constitute a violation of [the exclusive right to prepare derivative works], the infringing 
work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form; for example, a 
detailed commentary on a work or a programmatic musical composition inspired by a novel 
would not normally constitute infringements under this clause.  
Id.  
 236. Kelly, 336 F.3d 811 (thumbnail and lower-resolution pictures). 
 237. Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (cached snapshot of websites). 
 238. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). See also Turnitin, 
Originality Checking, http://www.turnitin.com/resources/documentation/turnitin/sales/OC_one_ 
page.pdf (last visited May 1, 2010) (detailing Turnitin.com features). 
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cases or in cases with outputs that resemble the traditional markets of the 
copyright holder. Under my Creation-Operation-Output spectrum, they fall 
at the far end of the spectrum and raise greater concern about a superseding 
use than a case with a limited output. Yet, as Sony shows, even verbatim 
output uses can be fair uses. Admittedly, my Creation-Operation-Output 
spectrum alone cannot resolve the difficult question posed by verbatim 
output uses.239 The question must be answered in light of consideration of 
all the fair use factors, as well as the context. On average, the spectrum 
allows less leeway for output uses, but it may still allow a verbatim output 
in an appropriate case. 
 
TABLE 4.  Summary of Unsuccessful Technological Fair Use Cases 
Creational Uses                           Operational Uses                           Output Uses 




MP3.com  space shifting 
(verbatim copies) 
MP3.com          
(verbatim copies) 






CleanFlicks    
(derivative works) 
CleanFlicks    
(derivative works) 
Psystar Mac clones 
(verbatim copies) 
Psystar (close to 
verbatim copies) 
Psystar (close to 
verbatim copies) 
d.  What Weight Should Be Given to Commercial Versus Nonprofit 
Educational Purposes? 
The next consideration under factor one in § 107 is “whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”240 
Campbell downplays the significance of the commercial-versus-nonprofit 
educational inquiry, at least in the context of parodies.241 Just as a 
commercial use is not presumptively unfair, so too a nonprofit educational 
 
 239. For example, von Lohmann contends that fair use should condone the verbatim copying that 
is enabled by private copying technologies, such as the iPod with music files and TiVo with its various 
forms of time-shifting functions. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 835–40. Samuelson suggests a 
trend in this direction. See Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 37, at 2602–05. I reserve judgment on 
the matter. 
 240. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006). 
 241. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (explaining that 
commercial use should not be viewed as determinative but instead as only one factor in a multifactor 
analysis). 
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use is not presumptively fair.242 The Court also stated that “the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other 
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair 
use.”243 Therefore, the commercial nature of the parody did not factor 
much, if at all, into the analysis given the Court’s view that many 
expressive works subject to parodies are commercial.244 
I agree with the Campbell Court’s admonition that the commerciality 
factor may often weigh less in the fair use analysis than the transformative 
factor.245 For example, consider whether all the copies of copyrighted 
works that are generated by the Internet through its automated 
transmissions should be deemed fair uses. Whether or not the Internet had 
been developed for commercial or nonprofit educational purposes, or both, 
seems less significant than the general societal value that the Internet 
provides. In the case of the Internet, the technology eventually served both 
(and many more) purposes. Likewise, in the case of Google Book Search, 
the profit-making company Google teamed up with an alliance of nonprofit 
educational universities and public libraries to develop the vast database of 
searchable texts.246 The value to society resulting from the ability to search 
inside millions of texts probably would not change depending upon 
whether a corporation or a nonprofit created it. As these examples 
demonstrate, in evaluating fair use we must avoid giving undue weight to 
the commerciality factor. 
Commercial and nonprofit educational elements are not completely 
irrelevant, however. I believe it is relevant to fair use whether the 
technology in question is offered for free or instead at a high price to the 
public. Just imagine that the visual search engines were only offered for a 
charge of $500 per month. Not only would the potential public benefit of 
the technology diminish given the access divide it may create between the 
haves and have-nots, but also selling the technology at a very high price to 
the public might cast some doubt on the worthiness of fair use. In essence, 
the use is not really “fair” or reasonable because the public benefits so little 
from it.247  
 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 579. 
 244. See id. at 584–85. 
 245. See Beebe, supra note 196, at 606 (noting how twenty-six of twenty-eight fair use decisions 
finding both transformativeness and commercial purpose present ultimately decided in favor of fair 
use). 
 246. See infra note 323 and accompanying text. 
 247. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Commentary, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990) (discussing fairness as a central consideration in finding a case of fair use). 
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Conversely, a nonprofit educational purpose may cut in favor of fair 
use. Imagine that the alliance of nonprofit universities, without Google, 
were the only ones developing an Internet book search that was offered for 
free to students and the public. That scenario might arguably weigh at least 
slightly more in favor of fair use than a case involving a for-profit 
corporation like Google, particularly if the nonprofit universities derived no 
income or reimbursement for their book search.248 In this context, fair use 
operates as a public works project of sorts. 
In sum, in technological fair use cases, whether or not a use is made 
for commercial or nonprofit educational purposes should not matter as 
much as whether the speech technology in question has a new or value-
adding purpose and provides a potential public benefit. However, at 
opposite ends, charging the public high fees in a profit-making venture may 
militate against fair use, whereas a technology offered for free or for a 
nonprofit educational purpose may cut in favor of fair use.  
e.  Summary of Factor One 
Thus, by the end of factor one, the court will have determined whether 
the case involves a possible technological fair use, specifically: (1) whether 
the alleged fair use has been made for the new or value-adding (that is, 
transformative) purpose of creating, operating, or providing an output of a 
technology or application; (2) whether the technology or application has a 
potential public benefit that may be reasonably perceived; and (3) whether 
the alleged fair use supersedes the purposes of the original work. In 
considering these questions, a court should consider the stage at which the 
work is used by or with the technology—the creation, operation, or output 
of the technology, with more leeway offered typically at the creation and 
operation stages. If a technology in question has a transformative (or value-
adding) purpose in using the work in a way that provides a public benefit, it 
cuts in favor of fair use. In such a case, (4) the commerciality of the use 
tends to weigh less heavily in the analysis, except in cases where the 
 
 248. My approach is consistent with how courts have analyzed commerciality and nonprofit 
educational purpose in practice. According to the Beebe study, “[A] commercial purpose (which was 
made in 64.4% of the opinions) did not significantly influence the outcome of the fair use test in favor 
of an overall finding of no fair use,” whereas “a finding that the defendant’s use was for a 
noncommercial purpose (which was made in 15.4% of the opinions) . . . strongly influenced the 
outcome of the test in favor of an overall finding of fair use.” Beebe, supra note 196, at 602 (emphasis 
added). Rebecca Tushnet offers a compelling argument for greater recognition of the importance of the 
noncommercial factor: “[M]ore important is that noncommercial creative uses, precisely because they 
are not motivated by copyright’s profit-based incentives, are more likely to contain content that the 
market would not produce or sustain . . . .” Tushnet, supra note 198, at 507. 
DO NOT DELETE 8/9/2010 9:41:24 AM 
850 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:797 
 
technology is offered to the public only at an exorbitant cost. Likewise, a 
free technology or one offered for a nonprofit educational purpose (the 
public-works-project rationale) cuts in favor of technological fair use. 
2.  Factor Two: Nature of the Copyrighted Work Has Less Weight 
Factor two of fair use, which is “the nature of the copyrighted 
work,”249 weighs less heavily in technological fair use cases. In the run-of-
the-mill case, courts tend to accord fictional or artistic works greater 
copyright protection than factual works.250 Yet, as seen in the case of 
parodies, courts sometimes minimize the weight of this factor, even for 
fictional and artistic works.251 As the Campbell Court explained, this factor 
is “not much help . . . or ever likely to help much” in determining what is 
fair use in parody cases because parodies “almost invariably copy publicly 
known, expressive works.”252 
A similar approach should apply to technological fair use cases. If a 
technology has a transformative or value-adding purpose, such as a visual 
search engine or antiplagiarism technology, whether the works used are 
factual or fictional/artistic is a poor way to determine whether the 
technological use or technology should be allowed. For example, giving 
greater leeway to a software developer to make fair uses by copying factual 
works for use in antiplagiarism technology, but less leeway for fictional 
works, seems irrational. An antiplagiarism technology that could only 
detect plagiarism of factual works would leave a gaping hole for creative 
writing courses, not to mention the commercial publishing of fictional 
works, which sometimes involve plagiarism incidents. In either case, 
plagiarism should be discouraged just as strongly for fictional and factual 
writings. The general principle that the scope of copyright is narrower for 
factual works (because facts are not protected) is misplaced when 
unacknowledged, verbatim copying of academic writing is involved.253 
Likewise, it seems arbitrary to allow as fair use time-shift home recordings 
of documentaries, sporting events, news programs, and reality shows but 
 
 249. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006). 
 250. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (stating that “[t]his factor 
calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, 
with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied” and 
citing cases contrasting fictional and factual works). 
 251. See, e.g., id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. The Fourth Circuit found the factual/fictional distinction to be less important in analyzing the 
second factor in the A.V. case. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 640 (4th Cir. 
2009) (finding that “the creative nature of the work is mitigated” where antiplagiarism software used 
the work only to detect plagiarism). 
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not those of any fictional sitcoms or dramas. Being able to watch a 
television program at home at a more convenient time is neither more nor 
less deserving based on the type of show being broadcast. In short, the 
nature of the copyrighted work in technological fair use cases should not 
matter as much as it does in the typical case. One exception, however, 
should be made with respect to functional works. Functional features do 
not fall within the core of copyright and often are not even within the scope 
of copyright at all, so more freedom should be allowed for their copying.254 
3.  Factor Three: Amount and Substantiality of the Work Copied, Judged 
Under the Creation-Operation-Output Spectrum 
Factor three is “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”255 As the Court explained, 
factor three should be analyzed in conjunction with factor one because “the 
extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the 
use.”256 Courts consider both the quantity and quality or importance of 
copied material in relation to the work as a whole.257 Yet quantity alone 
sometimes correlates with fair use results. As the Beebe study found, 
“[T]he more the defendant takes of the plaintiff’s work, the less likely it is 
that the taking will qualify as a fair use.”258 However, as discussed above 
for factor one, for technological fair use cases, the amount and 
substantiality of the work copied should be analyzed at the stage of use of 
the copyrighted work—whether during creation, operation, or output of the 
technology, with more leeway offered at the creation and operation stages 
than at the output stage. Verbatim copies are less worrisome at the creation 
and operation stages than at the output stage. 
4.  Factor Four: Effect on the Potential Market for the Copyrighted Work 
and Effect on the Potential Market for the Speech Technology 
The fourth factor is “the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.”259 This factor “requires courts to 
consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular 
actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and 
 
 254. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(discussing disassembly). 
 255. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006). 
 256. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87. 
 257. Id. at 587. 
 258. Beebe, supra note 196, at 615. 
 259. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
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widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would 
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the 
original,” including the market for derivative works.260 
Factor four has proven to be one of the most important factors,261 as 
well as the most disputed. The major problem is the so-called circularity 
problem: the copyright holder can always claim an economic harm from an 
unlicensed use of its work, even in unformed markets or for unforeseen 
uses of a work.262 Taken to an extreme, this reasoning creates a circularity 
problem: nothing can be fair use because everything can be licensed.263 To 
address this problem, the Second Circuit has held that the copyright holder 
only has a claim of licensing in “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be 
developed” markets.264 Whether this solves the circularity problem is 
debatable. 
In technological fair use cases, this problem becomes even more 
pronounced because the technology in question often involves an emerging 
market for which no prior copyright relations or practices have been 
established. For example, Sony involved the emerging market for VCRs,265 
the Kelly case involved the emerging market of visual search engines, and 
the A.V. case involved the emerging market of antiplagiarism technology 
for schools. In none of these cases did the emerging market involve the 
formal commercial licensing of the vast majority of works in question. In 
other words, in emerging markets, the parties are initially writing on a 
blank slate. The question then becomes whether the copyright holder’s 
exclusive rights should extend into the emerging market to control uses of 
 
 260. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (alteration in original) (quoting 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4] (1993)). 
 261. The Beebe study suggests a strong correlation between factor four and the ultimate decision 
on fair use. See Beebe, supra note 196, at 617 (noting that 140 of 141 cases finding that factor four 
disfavored fair use ruled against fair use, while 110 of 116 cases finding it favored fair use eventually 
found a fair use). Beebe suggests that factor four “essentially constitutes a metafactor under which 
courts integrate their analyses of the other three factors and, in doing so, arrive at the outcome not 
simply of the fourth factor, but of the overall test.” Id. 
 262. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1569, 1588–89 & n.78 (2009). 
 263. See Am. Geophyiscal Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–30, 929 n.17 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(stating that not every effect on potential licensing revenues enters the analysis under the fourth factor); 
James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 
895–98 (2007). 
 264. Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930. 
 265. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S 417 (1984). The case took 
eight years to litigate, during which time the market for VCRs evolved considerably. See Lee, Warming 
Up, supra note 128, at 1483–84. Whether a practice is perceived as a fair use could change over time as 
more people engage in the custom or practice. 
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its works there. In some cases, the answer has been yes,266 but in other 
cases, no.267  
I do not attempt here to solve the circularity problem, except to 
caution courts from giving undue weight to the practicability (or lack 
thereof) of licensing works for use in a new technological market. Other 
considerations should factor into the analysis. 
First, in analyzing factor four, courts should consider whether the use 
supersedes the objects of the original copyrighted work.268 As the Court in 
Campbell noted, “[W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of 
the entirety of an original, it clearly ‘supersedes the objects’ . . . of the 
original and serves as a market replacement for it, making it likely that 
cognizable market harm to the original will occur.”269 But just as factor one 
is judged in terms of the Creation-Operation-Output spectrum, so too is 
factor four in technological fair use cases. Functional uses of copyrighted 
works to create or operate a speech technology are less likely to be within 
the purview of the copyright holder’s market.270 Copyright was not 
intended to cover functional things or the realm of technological 
innovation.271 Under the Free Press Clause, breathing room is necessary for 
speech technologies to develop.272 By contrast, output uses of copyrighted 
works may be more likely to raise issues of superseding use and market 
harm to the value of the copyrighted work. Yet the manner of output (for 
example, thumbnail-size images or brief snippets) and context in which it is 
made (for example, home personal use, school use, or an Internet tool) are 
still relevant. 
Second, a court should consider the technology’s possible positive 
effects on the potential market for the copyrighted work. Section 107 is not 
limited to the harmful or negative effects of a particular use of a 
copyrighted work—it simply says “effect.”273 Sometimes speech 
technologies yield positive effects on the market for the original work, such 
 
 266. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 268. This consideration is also relevant to factor one. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994). 
 269. Id. (alteration in original omitted) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4901) 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841)). 
 270. See supra notes 226–32 and accompanying text. 
 271. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 272. See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 273. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.”). 
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as making the works easier for everyone to find and purchase. For example, 
the VCR opened up a new market for television shows and movies by 
facilitating a home rental and sale market.274 The technology was 
“complementary,” in economic terms, to the copyrighted works.275 
Finally, courts should consider the effect a finding against fair use 
would have on the market for the speech technology in question. Although 
this consideration is not expressly noted in the four factors,276 it is related 
to the consideration in factor one of the public benefit from the use of the 
work. Assuming that a court “reasonably perceives” a public benefit from a 
technology under factor one, it is appropriate for the court to consider how 
that public benefit from the technology might be affected by the disposition 
of the case. For example, the Sony Court was rightfully concerned about 
turning the VCR into contraband.277 This factor reminds courts of the need 
to avoid allowing copyrights to have a patent-like effect in controlling 
technologies.278 As discussed earlier, fair use operates as a First 
Amendment safeguard within copyright law, acting as a safety valve to 
protect free press and technology interests. A court should not ignore how a 
ruling against fair use in a technology case might negatively affect, if not 
destroy, an emerging market for a speech technology. 
B.  ROLE FOR CONGRESS 
This Article focuses on improving the fair use doctrine to handle 
technology cases mainly through the courts’ development of the doctrine, 
as courts have traditionally done since the emergence of our copyright 
system. In terms of a comparative institutional analysis,279 courts have 
proven to be much better equipped to deal with rapid technological change, 
incrementally, in specific cases, than Congress has legislatively.280 
 
 274. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 841 (“[I]ncreasing demand for one [product] results in 
increasing demand for the other.”). 
 276. Congress gave courts the power to consider other factors in analyzing fair use by using the 
language “include” before listing the four factors. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. See also Field v. Google Inc., 
412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122 (D. Nev. 2006) (considering Google’s good faith as an “additional factor” 
and stating that “[t]he Copyright Act authorizes courts to consider other factors than the four non-
exclusive factors [listed in § 107]”). 
 277. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–56 (1984) 
(concluding that the VCR yielded public benefits that should not be limited given the minimal 
likelihood of harm to respondents’ copyrights). 
 278. See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
 279. For a definition of “comparative institutional analysis,” see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994). 
 280. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 134–39 (2004) (discussing 
how a property rights approach may be preferable to a regulatory approach in certain instances). See 
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Yet Congress also has an important role to play in ensuring that the 
copyright system does not curb innovation in speech technologies. 
Throughout the history of our copyright law, Congress has enacted specific 
exemptions,281 safe harbors,282 and compulsory licenses to deal with 
advances in new technologies that affect copyrighted works.283 On the 
other hand, sometimes Congress “deals” with new technologies by 
attempting to limit them or by providing greater protections for copyright 
holders, as was the case with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.284 
Although it goes beyond the scope of the Article to set forth a legislative 
agenda for Congress, it is important for Congress to concentrate its efforts, 
not on attempting to proscribe speech technologies, but instead on 
protecting them through exemptions, safe harbors, and compulsory licenses 
(or simply by adopting a hands-off approach). Fred von Lohmann’s 
suggestion that Congress should adopt a policy to “innovate broadly first, 
regulate narrowly later”285 seems sensible, especially when it is inherently 
difficult to predict how new technologies will develop. 
V.  APPLYING TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE TO RECENT CASES 
This part applies my proposed framework to two recent controversies: 
Google Book Search (“GBS”) and Amazon’s text-to-speech function on the 
Kindle e-reader. When analyzed under my framework, GBS itself involves 
a legitimate technological fair use, but the digital copies of the scanned 
works that Google transmits to participating libraries (the so-called library 
copies) are not technological fair uses and may have more contestable 
claims of fair use under the standard fair use analysis. Likewise, Amazon’s 
Kindle also involves a technological fair use. 
 
 
also David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1326–44 (2004) 
(describing ineffective legislation enacted by Congress to address technological change). It goes beyond 
this Article’s scope to evaluate whether more copyright rulemaking should be delegated to an 
administrative agency, such as the Copyright Office. For an analysis of this issue, see, for example, Liu, 
supra, at 148–59; Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 
551, 556 (2007). 
 281. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2006) (providing an exemption for DVD skipping 
technology). 
 282. See, e.g., id. § 512 (outlining the DMCA safe harbors for Internet service providers). 
 283. See, e.g., id. § 111(c) (compulsory license for secondary transmissions by cable television 
operators). 
 284. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 285. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 854. 
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A.  GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH 
Although the GBS case was settled pending final approval of the court 
after the class action fairness hearing,286 we should examine GBS under my 
proposed framework to illustrate how the framework works in practice. 
Because the settlement has drawn objections and an antitrust investigation 
by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”),287 the fair use question is useful for 
comparison’s sake. 
The proposed settlement is incredibly complex and ambitious. The 
DOJ, among others, objected to the original proposal on numerous grounds, 
including copyright, antitrust, and class action requirements under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.288 To address these objections, the parties 
offered a revised settlement,289 but the DOJ filed an objection to the revised 
settlement as well.290 
What is striking about the settlement is that it attempts not only to 
settle the copyright dispute between Google and the plaintiffs, but also to 
structure dramatically the industry for online book searching and solve (or 
sidestep) the orphan works problem, an issue that Congress has considered 
without success.291 That is why the DOJ described the settlement as “one of 
the most far-reaching class action settlements of which the United States is 
aware.”292 The DOJ went even further: “A global disposition of the rights 
to millions of copyrighted works is typically the kind of policy change 
implemented through legislation, not through a private judicial 
 
 286. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. For an excellent summary of the original proposed 
settlement, see James Grimmelmann, How to Fix the Google Book Search Settlement, 12 No. 10 J. 
INTERNET L. 1, 11 (2009). For Google’s summary of the major revisions to the original settlement 
proposal, see Posting of Dan Clancy to Google Public Policy Blog, http://googlepublicpolicy. 
blogspot.com/ (Nov. 13, 2009, 23:54 EST) (search for “Revised Google Books Settlement” and select 
“here” hyperlink in the third paragraph). On November 19, 2009, then–District Judge Denny Chin 
granted preliminary approval of the Amended Settlement Agreement. Order Granting Preliminary 
Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136-DC 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009). 
 287. See Miguel Helft, U.S. Presses Antitrust Inquiry into Google Book Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 10, 2009, at B5. 
 288. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed Class 
Settlement, Authors Guild, No. 05 CV 8136-DC (Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter First DOJ Objection]. 
 289. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32. 
 290. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed Amended 
Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, No. 05 CV 8136-DC (Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Second DOJ 
Objection]. 
 291. See First DOJ Objection, supra note 288, at 6–7 (discussing “forward-looking business 
arrangements” proposed by the settlement and the problem of orphan works). 
 292. Id. at 1. 
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settlement.”293 Nonetheless, the DOJ believed that a properly structured 
settlement in this case “offer[ed] the potential for important societal 
benefits” and hoped the parties would revise the settlement to address the 
DOJ’s objections.294  
Under the amended settlement, Google can do much more 
commercially with the copyrighted works than it could before the lawsuit, 
but not without a price. Without admitting any liability, Google must pay a 
minimum of $45 million to the plaintiff class for Google’s past use of 
works in GBS.295 In addition, Google must pay $34.5 million to establish 
the Book Rights Registry (discussed below) devised under the 
settlement,296 as well as a maximum of $30 million for the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees.297 Google is then allowed to display in “preview uses” not 
just snippets of copyrighted works but up to 20 percent of the qualifying 
works.298 The 20 percent default for such preview uses applies only to out-
of-print books, but not to in-print books, which are treated as “no display” 
books unless the copyright holders give consent.299 In other words, 
copyright holders of out-of-print books—including potentially orphan 
works whose authors cannot be identified or located—must opt out of the 
GBS in order to stop it from commercializing their works, while copyright 
holders of in-print books enjoy the rights to opt in, with GBS not otherwise 
allowed to commercialize in-print books.300  
The opt-out default rule for out-of-print works affects a substantial 
amount of works in GBS. By some estimates, the majority of works in 
GBS, some 70 percent of the database, consists of out-of-print works.301 
The out-of-print works utilized under the settlement are limited to works 
registered in the United States or published in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and Canada302—a limitation added to address European and 
 
 293. Id. at 2. 
 294. Id. at 4. 
 295. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 5.1(b). 
 296. Id. § 5.2. 
 297. Id. § 5.5. 
 298. Id. § 4.3(b)(i)(1). 
 299. See id. §§ 3.2–3.4. See also id. §§ 1.51–1.52, 1.91 (providing definitions for “Display 
Books,” “Display Uses,” and “No Display Books,” respectively).  
 300. Ironically, if not perversely, under this arrangement, the people least likely to be able to opt 
out (because they are unidentifiable or absent) must opt out to exclude their works from exploitation, 
while the people most likely to be able to opt out (because they are identifiable or present) do not have 
to do anything to prevent their works from being exploited. 
 301. See Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The Dead Souls of the Google Book Search 
Settlement, 52 COMM. OF ACM, July 2009, at 28, 28 [hereinafter Samuelson, Dead Souls]. 
 302. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 1.19 (definition of “book”). 
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Asian objections to GBS.303 
In addition, Google is allowed to exploit commercially its database 
much more dramatically, including for out-of-print and orphan works, 
through advertising,304 institutional subscriptions,305 and other forms of 
monetization.306 Thus, under the settlement, not only is Google allowed to 
make greater display of orphan and out-of-print works, but it is also 
allowed to monetize the works with advertisements in preview uses307—a 
big change from Google’s original practice of not running ads for snippet 
views of works.308 The monetization plan is facilitated by the establishment 
of a Book Rights Registry (“BRR”), a collecting-rights organization that 
will serve as a clearinghouse through which Google and the authors and 
publishers that register their works will share royalties for monetization of 
the vast number of works in GBS309—with the rights holders receiving 63 
percent of the royalties and Google receiving 37 percent.310 The original 
proposal had even allowed Google and the identified rights holders to share 
in the proceeds obtained from “orphan works” whose owners could not be 
identified or found.311 After intense objections alleging a conflict of 
interest,312 the parties changed the arrangement to limit the use of revenues 
from such works to benefit the absent rights holders, along with the 
designation of a fiduciary who would act on behalf of and attempt to locate 
the absent rights holders.313  
Comparing the GBS settlement to Google’s original claim of fair use 
before the lawsuit is like comparing apples to oranges—or perhaps 
 
 303. See Posting of Danny Sullivan to Search Engine Land, http://searchengineland.com/revised-
google-book-settlement-filed-29814 (Nov. 14, 2009, 00:31 EST). 
 304. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 3.14 (“Google may display advertisements 
on Preview Use pages and other Online Book Pages . . . .”). 
 305. See id. § 4.1(a) (detailing general guidelines for pricing of institutional subscriptions). 
 306. See id. § 4.2 (discussing consumer purchases). See also id. § 4.3(e) (discussing preview 
uses); id. § 4.4 (discussing the allocation of revenues from advertising uses). 
 307. See id. §§ 3.14, 4.3. 
 308. See GOOGLE, THE FACTS ABOUT GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH (2006), available at 
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/pdf/gbsoverview.pdf [hereinafter GBS Facts]. 
 309. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 6.1. 
 310. See id. § 2.1(a). 
 311. Original GBS Settlement, supra note 32, §§ 2.1(a), 3.8(b), 6.1–6.3. 
 312. See First DOJ Objection, supra note 288, at 9–10. See also Samuelson, Dead Souls, supra 
note 301, at 30; Chris Castle, Is Google’s Culture Grab Unstoppable?, REGISTER, Dec. 31, 2008, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/12/31/chris_castle_google_books_and_beyond/; Pamela Samuelson, 
Google Books Is Not a Library, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
pamela-samuelson/google-books-is-not-a-lib_b_317518.html; Pamela Samuelson, The Audacity of the 
Google Book Search Settlement, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 10, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
pamela-samuelson/the-audacity-of-the-googl_b_255490.html [hereinafter Samuelson, The Audacity]. 
 313. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 6.3. 
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watermelons to peanuts. As the DOJ recognized, the settlement is 
tantamount to comprehensive legislation that has a huge scope and effect 
on many people and issues.314 A finding of fair use in the GBS case, had 
the issue been resolved, would have been a substantial legal development, 
but it still could not have established a BRR or engineered the type of 
monetization of the online book industry that the settlement contemplates. 
But a finding of fair use would have offered at least two things that the 
settlement does not. First, a fair use finding would have obviated the need 
for any royalties to be paid or for permission to be obtained, which could 
have benefited not only Google, but also other entities seeking to build 
similar book search technologies. One major concern with the settlement is 
that, although the BRR arrangement is nonexclusive, Google and book 
publishers will have tremendous power to control the entire book search 
industry with prices they set.315 The settlement now makes it even more 
unlikely that another competing service will attempt to do what GBS set 
out to do—make an online book search tool, with limited snippet views of 
copyrighted works, supported by fair use. A competitor of Google must 
either pay to enter the market or face a class action copyright lawsuit. 
Second, a finding of fair use would have provided a better way to 
balance the interests of absent rights holders of orphan and out-of-print 
copyrighted works. Instead of the default of 20 percent display plus 
monetization of their works, absent rights holders would have only snippets 
of their works used without their permission—and without any direct 
monetization. The noncommercialized snippet display of works in the 
original GBS316 is more respectful of the absent rights holders than the 
settlement’s contemplated 20 percent default use of out-of-print works in 
potentially commercialized displays, sales, and subscriptions. Put simply, 
the more extensive, commercialized uses of the orphan and out-of-print 
works under the settlement are arguably not fair uses, while the limited, 
 
 314. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.  
 315. See Press Release, Booksellers Association, Statement from the BA, Nov. 13, 2008, 
available at http://www.thebookseller.com/documents/BA_Google_Statement.pdf (“As such a 
dominant player in the online world, Google will now occupy a unique gateway position that, if abused, 
could easily create a de facto monopoly.”). See generally Fred von Lohmann, Google Is Done Paying 
Silicon Valley’s Legal Bills, RECORDER (S.F.), Nov. 14, 2008, at 5, available at 2008 WLNR 27146940 
(“In essence, Google has left its former copyright adversaries to maul any competitors . . . .”). At least 
the most objectionable clause in the original settlement—the so-called most favored nation clause—was 
removed. It would have given Google the right to receive the same terms as any better offer the BRR 
made with a competing service. See Original GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 3.8(a). 
 316. See infra note 324 and accompanying text. 
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noncommercialized snippet uses were fair uses.317 
Thus, in evaluating how desirable the amended settlement is as a 
whole, it is worth at least considering how strong Google’s fair use claim 
was. As the analysis below shows, (1) the basic technology of GBS 
constituted a technological fair use, in part because the verbatim copies of 
copyrighted works are used only for creating and operating the search 
technology, but with an output of the copyrighted works that is quite 
limited—a “few snippets” of the copyrighted works318—to the public; and 
(2) the more debatable question of fair use, however, concerns the digital 
copies Google provided to the participating libraries putatively for archival 
purposes.319 
1.  Factor One 
First, the purpose of Google’s use of verbatim copies of the entirety of 
millions of copyrighted works was to create and operate the new 
technology of an online search tool that could search inside the texts of 
millions of books.320 The purpose of creating a better technology to find 
information is a legitimate technological fair use purpose, as several courts 
have correctly found in other search engine cases.321 A public benefit may 
undoubtedly be “reasonably perceived” from the GBS—it enables 
members of the public to find information from millions of books that they 
might not otherwise have been able to find. Moreover, it does so in a 
way—with only limited viewing or snippets of the relevant texts for 
searching, akin to a thumbnail for photographs—that arguably does not 
 
 317. See Samuelson, The Audacity, supra note 312 (concluding that the snippet view was a fair 
use but that the settlement goes further to “give Google a license to commercialize all books owned by 
the class”). 
 318. See Google Books, Google Books Library Project, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/ 
library.html (last visited May 1, 2010) (“When you click on a search result for a book from the Library 
Project, you’ll see basic bibliographic information about the book, and in many cases, a few snippets—
a few sentences showing your search term in context.”). 
 319. See Band, supra note 70, at 18. Google states: “Each library will receive a digital copy of 
every book we scan . . . from their respective collections. Each library will treat their copies in 
accordance with copyright law.” Google Books, Books Help, http://books.google.com/support/bin/ 
answer.py?answer=43751 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (answering the question, “Do the libraries get a 
copy of the book?”). 
 320. See Google Books, About Google Books, History, http://books.google.com/intl/en/ 
googlebooks/history.html (last visited May 1, 2010). 
 321. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 720–23 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(considering an attempt to create a better online search technology); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 
F.3d 811, 818–20 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118–19 (D. Nev. 
2006) (considering the development of search engine technology through the use of cached links). See 
also Menell, supra note 37, at 1019–40 (discussing the historical policy in favor of allowing access to 
knowledge, dating back to the Royal Library of Alexandria). 
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supersede the purposes of the original. Indeed, because GBS also directs 
readers where to buy the relevant book (if available) from bookstores along 
with the search results,322 GBS adds value to the original works by 
promoting the books. Although Google is commercial, the participation of 
the many nonprofit educational and university institutions323 provides a 
significant counterweight to the commerciality, as does the fact that GBS is 
offered entirely for free on the Internet for everyone in the world to enjoy. 
In addition, before the settlement, Google did not run ads on the snippet 
view page of copyrighted works in the GBS.324 In short, the first factor cuts 
in favor of fair use as to the copies used to create, operate, and supply the 
output of GBS. The verbatim copies of the books are necessary to create 
and operate a comprehensive search tool that helps readers find relevant 
information, yet GBS provides only limited output of the works—mere 
snippets of the works—to the public. 
By contrast, Google’s dissemination of digital copies of the works to 
the participating libraries and universities (whose books were digitized) 
does not fall within the purposes of a technological fair use—to create or 
operate a technology.325 As such, the ostensibly archival copies for the 
libraries must be analyzed under a standard fair use analysis. On this 
question, the issue is more debatable. Given the very detailed exemption in 
the Copyright Act for library copying of works for archival and 
replacement purposes, which requires as conditions for archiving that the 
existing copy be damaged and that another copy of the work “cannot be 
 
 322. See Google Books Library Project, supra note 318 (“In all cases, you’ll see links directing 
you to online bookstores where you can buy the book and libraries where you can borrow it.”). 
 323. The participating libraries include Bavarian State Library, Columbia University, Committee 
on Institutional Cooperation (CIC), Cornell University Library, Harvard University, Ghent University 
Library, Keio University Library, Lyon Municipal Library, National Library of Catalonia, New York 
Public Library, Oxford University, Princeton University, Stanford University, University of California, 
University Complutense of Madrid, University Library of Lausanne, University of Michigan, 
University of Texas at Austin, University of Virginia, and University of Wisconsin–Madison. See 
Google Books, Library Partners, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/partners.html (last visited May 
1, 2010). 
 324. See GBS Facts, supra note 308. 
 325. One possible argument to the contrary is that the digital copies were part of the bargain to 
persuade the libraries to participate in GBS. Therefore, one might argue that as a quid pro quo, the 
library copies were necessary to create GBS. Jonathan Band contends that the library copies should be 
considered “ancillary to the index copy; Google made the library copies as consideration for obtaining 
access to the book for the purpose of making the index copy.” Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding 
Road to the Google Books Settlement, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 257 (2010). Such 
“bargain” uses fall outside the concept of creational uses and must, therefore, be analyzed under 
standard fair use analysis. The library copies are not technologically necessary to create or operate 
GBS.  
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obtained at a fair price,”326 one might argue that Google’s library copies cut 
against fair use—the need for archiving through copying does not yet 
appear to be established. While it is possible that many of the books are no 
longer obtainable at a fair price,327 it is still not clear whether the books 
involved in GBS are actually damaged. Also, the systematic production of 
archival copies for the libraries may resemble the infringement found in the 
systematic making of journal copies for researchers to archive in American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.328  
On the other hand, § 108 does not necessarily preclude a fair use 
argument. Indeed, subsection (f) states, “Nothing in this section . . . in any 
way affects the right of fair use.”329 Thus, § 108 is a floor, not a ceiling. 
The more general fair use defense can still be invoked. Both § 108 and 
§ 117, which provides an exemption for making archival copies for 
computer programs, provide general support for the notion that some 
archiving should be deemed permissible and reasonable under copyright 
law.330 Moreover, it might be highly impractical and wasteful to require the 
libraries to wait until their materials have deteriorated before they can 
create and archive digital copies, especially when Google has already done 
so using the libraries’ own books. By the time the works deteriorate, it may 
well be too late. Unlike Texaco, the libraries here (with the exception of 
Google being a commercial entity) are nonprofit educational institutions.331 
And to the extent that it is still good law, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United 
States, though decided under the Copyright Act of 1909, did recognize fair 
use in the context of institutional copying at the National Institutes of 
Health and National Library of Medicine.332 In any event, the archival 
copies fall outside my technological fair use framework and must be 
analyzed under the standard fair use analysis. 
 
 326. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c)(1), (e) (2006). For archiving, § 108 requires that the reproduction be 
“solely for the purpose of replacement of a copy or phonorecord that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or 
stolen, or if the existing format in which the work is stored has become obsolete.” Id. § 108(c). 
Subsection (h) does allow greater copying in digital form for preservation of copyrighted works in their 
last twenty years of copyright, provided that the work in question is neither “subject to normal 
commercial exploitation” nor obtainable at a reasonable price, and provided that the copyright owner 
has not provided notice establishing otherwise. Id. § 108(h). 
 327. By one estimate, 70 percent of the books are out of print. See Samuelson, Dead Souls, supra 
note 301, at 28. 
 328. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 329. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4). 
 330. See id. §§ 108, 117 (exemptions for certain archival copies). 
 331. Section 108 imposes a limitation in its exemption that the copying must be “made without 
any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage.” Id. § 108(a)(1). 
 332. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an 
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
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2.  Factor Two 
Factor two, “the nature of the copyrighted work,”333 weighs less 
heavily here for the copies used in GBS because they involve a 
technological fair use. Because the library copies do not involve a 
technological fair use, this factor may be applied in ordinary fashion for the 
library copies (less leeway for copying of fictional works versus factual 
works), although with verbatim copying, it probably does not make much 
difference. A lot more will depend on whether the archival copy is deemed 
to serve a legitimate purpose in factor one. 
3.  Factor Three 
Factor three favors a finding of technological fair use for the copies 
used in GBS. The copies of the works for GBS were tailored specifically 
for the value-adding purpose of creating a comprehensive, inside-the-text 
search tool that can provide a public benefit. Verbatim copies were used 
only to create and operate GBS, but the output was limited to snippets of 
the relevant works.334 
It is more debatable, however, for the library digital copies. Verbatim 
copies were disseminated to each participating library or university, 
ostensibly for the purpose of archiving.335 If the purpose of these copies is 
deemed to be questionable under factor one, or if a greater need for 
archiving is required to be shown, then copying the entirety of works likely 
cuts against fair use. 
4.  Factor Four 
Factor four favors fair use for the copies used in GBS. GBS may add 
value to the copyrighted works because, for each search result, it allows 
people to find relevant sources and also lists where a book can be bought or 
borrowed from a library.336 And GBS does so in a way that gives the reader 
only a snippet of the relevant work. Although perhaps in some cases 
browsing only a snippet of a book is enough to satisfy the reader, it would 
be surprising if a snippet would be enough to satisfy most readers who are 
looking for relevant books, especially given that GBS allows no snippet or 
preview of dictionaries or reference books.337 Allowing readers to browse 
 
 333. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
 334. See supra notes 308, 320 and accompanying text.  
 335. See supra note 319 and accompanying text. 
 336. See Band, supra note 70, at 17. 
 337. See Band, supra note 325, at 232. 
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just one or two lines of a book seems unlikely to eat into the sales of the 
work. Factor four thus raises the vexing problem of analyzing the effect on 
the potential licensing of works for use in the emerging, but still-
developing, market of online book search tools. This question raises the 
circularity problem for which courts have yet to devise a foolproof 
solution. Doubters of fair use may point to the proposed registry in the 
GBS Settlement (the BRR) as evidence that the copyright holders can 
effectively receive royalties by licensing their works for inclusion in the 
book search.338 This argument, I think, places too much stock on licensing 
as the measure of fair use. In this case, the market for licensing is still 
emerging and, as noted previously, the settlement itself raises serious 
antitrust concerns. The settlement gets around the licensing problem for 
copyrighted works only by the hocus pocus of a class action with absent, 
unidentified authors given the “chance” to opt out of an agreement made by 
others purportedly on their behalf.339 
We must also consider the effect a finding against fair use might have 
on the online book search market. Given the sheer amount of time, labor, 
and books needed to create a comprehensive book search of the magnitude 
Google envisions, a finding against fair use might jeopardize the entry of 
others to undertake such a project. The cost of running a project of that 
scale, with or without fair use, can be quite substantial. By one estimate, 
GBS will cost $750 million to scan 30 million books.340 If transaction costs 
are added, and if licenses must be obtained and royalties paid for inclusion 
of the works in the book search, that will only add further expense. Given 
the massive amount of resources needed, and the uncertain prospects of 
making profits from a book search, it is not surprising that in 2008, 
Microsoft pulled out of the Open Content Alliance, which is a similar book 
search project that is to be supported by paid licenses to the copyright 
holders for inclusion of their works.341 
Granted, the verbatim library copies might conflict with a traditional 
and well-established market of the copyright holders in selling books. But, 
if 70 percent of the copyrighted books are out-of-print (and not 
 
 338. See id. at 263, 284–85. 
 339. See Grimmelmann, supra note 286, at 12 (“The critical hole in this argument is that this isn’t 
a market that one can effectively negotiate in without the device of the class action lawsuit.”); 
Samuelson, Dead Souls, supra note 301, at 29–30. 
 340. Band, supra note 325, at 228. 
 341. See Satyu Nadella, Book Search Winding Down, BING, May 23, 2008, http://www.bing.com/ 
community/blogs/search/archive/2008/05/23/book-search-winding-down.aspx?PageIndex=1. For more 
on the Alliance, see Open Content Alliance, FAQ, http://www.opencontentalliance.org/faq/ (last visited 
May 1, 2010). 
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commercially exploited today), arguably little harm to the copyright 
holders would result from allowing library copies of such out-of-print 
books. Presumably, out-of-print books are not being commercially 
exploited except perhaps in used bookstores, whose sales do not redound to 
the copyright holders’ benefit anyway because of the first-sale doctrine.342  
In sum, the factors support a finding of technological fair use for GBS. 
However, the library copies are not for a technological purpose and should 
be analyzed under standard fair use (with respectable arguments that could 
be made on both sides). 
B.  AMAZON KINDLE’S TEXT-TO-SPEECH FUNCTION 
In 2009, Amazon disabled a new feature on the Kindle e-book reader 
that would have enabled it to have a computer-generated voice “read” a 
digital work aloud.343 This text-to-speech function drew the ire of book 
publishers that felt it might compete with audio books.344 As Paul Aitken, 
executive director of the Authors Guild, stated, “They don’t have the right 
to read a book out loud . . . . That’s an audio right, which is derivative 
under copyright law.”345 In response, Amazon (itself a major provider of 
audio books for book publishers) maintained that computer-generated 
audio of digital books would not threaten the current audio books with 
human voices.346 But, after receiving pressure from the Authors Guild, 
Amazon backed down.347  
In a statement, Amazon explained the reason for its about-face:  
Kindle 2’s experimental text-to-speech feature is legal: no copy is made, 
no derivative work is created, and no performance is being given. . . . 
Nevertheless, we strongly believe many rights holders will be more 
comfortable with the text-to-speech feature if they are in the driver’s 
seat. 
Therefore, we are modifying our systems so that rights holders can 
decide on a title by title basis whether they want text-to-speech enabled 
or disabled for any particular title. We have already begun to work on the 
 
 342. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (stating that “the owner of a particular copy . . . is entitled, 
without authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy”). 
 343. Posting of Brad Stone, supra note 19. 
 344. See Greg Sandoval, Book Publishers Object to Kindle’s Text-to-Voice Feature, CNET NEWS, 
Feb. 10, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10161104-93.html. 
 345. Geoffrey A. Fowler & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, New Kindle Audio Feature Causes a Stir, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2009, at B9.  
 346. See id. 
 347. See Posting of Brad Stone, supra note 19. 
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technical changes required to give authors and publishers that choice. 
With this new level of control, publishers and authors will be able to 
decide for themselves whether it is in their commercial interests to leave 
text-to-speech enabled. We believe many will decide that it is.348 
Advocates for people who are blind or visually impaired, and those with 
learning disabilities, protested the decision and criticized the Authors Guild 
for limiting the new functionality that could have improved their lives.349 
When considering the text-to-speech function under copyright law, 
probably no violation of any exclusive right of the copyright holders 
occurs. Although reading a book aloud is a performance,350 it is not a 
public performance unless it is performed “at a place open to the public or 
at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal 
circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.”351 It seems 
unlikely that people would ordinarily use the Kindle in either way to read a 
book to the public. Contrary to the Authors Guild’s suggestion, reading a 
book aloud, without it being captured in any permanent form, is not within 
the copyright holder’s right to make derivative works.352 If it were, parents 
all across America would be violating copyright law by reading to their 
children at night. 
But even assuming for argument’s sake that the read-aloud function 
violates one of the exclusive rights, it qualifies as a technological fair use 
as discussed below. 
1.  Factor One 
The Kindle’s performance of a copyrighted book is made for the 
purpose of creating a text-to-speech function on the new, developing line of 
 
 348. Id. 
 349. Posting of Alex Pham to L.A. Times Technology Blog, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
technology/2009/04/kindleblindreadaloud.html (Apr. 7, 2009, 16:30 EST). 
 350. See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 60 (1975) (“To ‘perform’ a work, under the definition in section 
101, includes reading a literary work aloud . . . .”). 
 351. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (providing the definition of performing or displaying a work 
“publicly”). The performance of the work by each individual Kindle does not involve transmissions to 
multiple members of the public and thus does not constitute a public performance under the second 
definition of “publicly.” See id. (defining publicly also to mean “to transmit or otherwise communicate 
a performance or display of the work to a place [described in the first definition of ‘publicly’] or to the 
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at 
different times”). 
 352. In order for a derivative work to be created, courts require that it be in some “concrete or 
permanent form.” See Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lewis 
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
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digital book readers—a clear technological fair use purpose.353 The 
functionality adds value to the e-book reader and the original work by 
allowing people to experience books in two different ways: by sight and by 
sound. For people who are blind or have learning disabilities, the added 
functionality may make digital books dramatically more accessible. To the 
extent the text-to-speech can serve underserved populations, such as the 
blind and people with learning disabilities, the public benefits. This result is 
consistent with the Senate Judiciary Committee report’s view on fair use: 
“[T]he making of a single copy or phonorecord by an individual as a free 
service for a blind person would properly be considered a fair use under 
section 107.”354 For other readers of books, the added functionality of the 
Kindle may increase their desire to buy books in the first place, given the 
new convenience of listening to a book at moments when reading is 
unavailable. Clearly, a public benefit may reasonably be perceived in 
giving consumers greater functionality in enjoying books. Factor one 
favors fair use. 
2.  Factor Two 
Because of the legitimate technological fair use purpose, the nature of 
the copyrighted works does not weigh heavily in the analysis. 
3.  Factor Three 
The amount and substantiality of the work copied is neutral or slightly 
favors fair use. The text-to-speech function does not create or distribute an 
audio copy of the work; it merely performs the work. The amount 
performed can potentially be the entire work, but the Kindle user decides 
how much to listen to. Although the Kindle involves both operational and 
output uses of the work, the output is the ephemeral performance of the 
work. Arguably, such evanescent performances enhance the user 
experience in a way similar to what constituted fair use in Galoob with the 
game enhancer’s enhancement of the display of video games.355 
 
 353. See supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
 354. See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 66 (1975). Congress enacted an exemption for the blind in 
§ 110(8), which would not apply here because it does not involve a qualifying entity. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 110(8) (2006) (exemption subject to the condition that “the performance is made without any purpose 
of direct or indirect commercial advantage and its transmission is made through the facilities of: (i) a 
governmental body; or (ii) a noncommercial educational broadcast station . . . ; or (iii) a radio subcarrier 
authorization . . . ; or (iv) a cable system”). 
 355. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968 (finding that the game enhancement software “merely enhances 
the audiovisual displays (or underlying data bytes) that originate in Nintendo game cartridges[, but] 
[t]he altered displays do not incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some concrete or 
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4.  Factor Four 
Factor four cuts in favor of fair use or is at least neutral. The Kindle’s 
reading a book aloud without creating a permanent copy is the functional 
equivalent of a person reading a book aloud—an activity that, if done 
nonpublicly, does not fall within the copyright holder’s market. Moreover, 
copyright holders receive money from Kindle’s popularity through 
royalties obtained from sales of digital books. And, of course, the copyright 
holders always have the power to charge more money for e-books. 
Although the Authors Guild may argue that the text-to-speech 
function substitutes for audio books, that is not necessarily the case. Audio 
books are permanent, audio (nontext) copies narrated typically by the 
authors themselves,356 celebrities, or people with mellifluous voices. Audio 
books are sold for multiple formats on CD and cassettes, or for digital 
download on MP3 players, thus reaching a much larger potential audience 
than the estimated 1.49 million Kindle owners.357 Given this relatively 
small size of the Kindle audience (at least currently), it seems speculative 
to conclude that the text-to-speech function would have a major dampening 
effect on sales of audio books. Many consumers of audio books probably 
do not even own a Kindle. And for the ones that do, the Kindle has a 
computer-generated voice,358 which may be less appealing than human 
voices on an audio book. Also, it is worth remembering that the book 
market consists of multiple formats, with print being the primary one. 
Audio books represent only a small percentage of U.S. publishers’ 
revenues. In 2008, U.S. publishers earned $24.3 billion, only $172 million 
of which were from the sale of audio books.359 The biggest market is the 
sale of adult and juvenile books, totaling $8.1 billion in the United 
States.360  
Thus, if there is competition among book formats, it is more likely to 
be between traditional books and e-books for reading, not listening. 
Already digital books for the Kindle are selling at 35 percent of the number 
 
permanent form” (emphasis omitted)). 
 356. For example, Sarah Palin narrates her recent biography, Going Rogue. See SARAH PALIN, 
GOING ROGUE: AN AMERICAN LIFE (2009) (audio CD-ROM, narrated by author).  
 357. Posting of Mitch Ratcliffe to ZDNet, http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ratcliffe/?p=486 (Dec. 26, 2009, 
21:02 PST). 
 358. See Fowler & Trachtenberg, supra note 345. 
 359. Press Release, Ass’n of Am. Publishers, Industry Statistics 2008: AAP Reports Book Sales 
Estimated at $24.3 Billion in 2008 (Mar. 31, 2009), available at http://www.publishers.org/main/ 
IndustryStats/indStats_02.htm. 
 360. Id. 
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of print books sold for the same title on Amazon.361 Whether the digital 
book market will be complementary or competitive to the traditional book 
market is hard to predict—much probably depends on the continued 
“stickiness” of, or consumer preference for, printed books.362 Yet 
ultimately that question is irrelevant to the fair use analysis for the simple 
reason that copyright holders have authorized the sale of e-books for the 
Kindle. In other words, authors have chosen to allow the possibility that 
their e-books might compete with their own printed books in the market. 
Finally, a finding against fair use would prevent Amazon from 
offering the text-to-speech function on the Kindle without getting licenses 
on a title-by-title basis. Although such a result might not dampen sales for 
the Kindle itself, it may retard the development of not only the text-to-
speech function, but other new functions that do not have the blessing of 
the Authors Guild or publishing industry. This kind of entanglement of the 
Guild in controlling speech technologies today, what Amazon called a 
“new level of control,”363 runs dangerously close to the pernicious control 
the Stationers’ Company exercised over the printing press.364 A finding of 
technological fair use would provide an important buffer between today’s 
guild of publishers and authors and the development of new speech 
technologies. 
VI.  ADDRESSING CONCERNS 
This part addresses a few concerns that my proposal may raise—
specifically, whether this framework provides the proper balance, how it 
fits into the overall copyright system, and international challenges. 
A.  TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE PROTECTION OF SPEECH TECHNOLOGIES? 
Some copyright holders may object to my proposal as giving too much 
protection to uses of their works in speech technologies—in effect arguing 
that the technologies are being subsidized by free uses of their works. 
Specifically, copyright industries may disagree with my argument in favor 
of according greater leeway for creational and operational uses—especially 
 
 361. Erick Schonfeld, For Books Available on Kindle, Sales Are Now Tracking at 35 Percent of 
Print Sales, TECHCRUNCH, May 6, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/05/06/for-books-available-
on-kindle-sales-are-now-tracking-at-35-percent-of-print-sales/. Amazon’s digital book sales will bring 
in an estimated $189 to $520 million in revenues. Id. 
 362. See Nicholson Baker, A New Page: Can the Kindle Really Improve on the Book?, NEW 
YORKER, Aug. 3, 2009, at 24; Sara Nelson, E-Dreaming, PUBLISHERS WKLY., June 30, 2008. 
 363. See Posting of Brad Stone, supra note 19. 
 364. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
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those involving verbatim copying. After all, copyright industries might 
argue, a copy is a copy, and copyright gives the holder the right to copy. 
Conversely, some critics or technology companies may criticize my 
proposal as not protective enough of technologies, especially those 
involving verbatim output uses of copyrighted works (such as for personal 
use) that are accorded comparatively less leeway on my Creation-
Operation-Output spectrum. 
As to the first objection by copyright industries, my response is 
twofold. First, fair use presumes that not all copies are infringing, so it is a 
nonstarter to say that a copy is a copy or to assert that permission must 
always be obtained. Second, the First Amendment and the Copyright and 
Patent Clause require some breathing room for the development of speech 
technologies unencumbered by the prospect that copyright holders can 
dictate the design of those technologies or else sue the developer to stop the 
technology in question. This does not mean that copyright industries have 
no role in shaping new speech technologies through informal dealings or 
dialogue with the technology sector. Both sectors could benefit from 
collaborative joint enterprises that attempt to give the public more options 
and products instead of the two sides wasting resources on threats of 
litigation or litigation itself. But, ultimately, the copyright industries should 
not have a “veto” over the speech technologies. The Creation-Operation-
Output spectrum is a balance of competing interests and involves some 
tradeoffs for all sides—with the goal of serving the public interest foremost 
in mind consistent with the Copyright Clause and First Amendment. The 
balance I have struck is faithful to how the Supreme Court has approached 
copyright-technology cases.365 
The technology companies’ objections can be addressed by my second 
response above: a balance must be struck between rewarding copyright 
holders and promoting the development of speech technologies. My 
 
 365. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005) (“The 
more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the 
administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff.” (citation omitted)); id. at 941 
(“The [Sony] case struck a balance between the interests of protection and innovation by holding that 
the product’s capability of substantial lawful employment should bar the imputation of fault and 
consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts of others.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance 
between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the 
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of 
commerce.”). Copyright holders have the opportunity to stop technological uses of their works by 
inventing and patenting the underlying technology in question. In order to stop purely functional uses of 
their works in new technologies, copyright holders must patent the new functions. 
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framework of technological fair use provides greater breathing room for 
speech technologies, but in a way that balances the competing interest of 
copyright holders. Although I have made the fair use factors more specific 
to technology cases, given fair use’s history and case law, some fact-
specific weighing of these factors is inevitable. Nonetheless, my framework 
offers an improvement over the status quo. It provides greater guidance and 
breathing room than before. For example, instead of uncertain claims of 
fair use, both Google and Amazon have pretty clear claims of fair use 
under my framework. Had courts already recognized technological fair use 
as a doctrine, Google and Amazon might well have continued to develop 
their technologies as they originally intended, instead of caving in to the 
demands of copyright industries. 
B.  ONLY ONE PART OF THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 
One must also bear in mind that technological fair use is only one part 
of the puzzle in analyzing the relationship between technologies and 
copyright law. Readers should not inflate the effect that such a doctrine 
alone can have on innovation of speech technologies, or expect that my 
framework should resolve every single controversy raised by a speech 
technology under copyright law. 
Within the copyright system, technological fair use is only one part of 
copyright law’s approach to new technologies. Indeed, new technologies 
are addressed in a number of ways, not just under fair use. There are 
(1) findings of no infringement for specific technologies in various 
cases,366 which obviates the need for analyzing fair use;367 (2) doctrinal and 
statutory exemptions for technologies, such as the Sony and DMCA safe 
 
 366. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 367. This approach dates back to some of the oldest technology cases. See White-Smith Music 
Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that perforated musical sheets for pianolas did not 
constitute a copy), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 
2541, 2544–45 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006)); Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 
584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888) (holding that perforated paper for organettes was not an infringement of 
copyrighted sheet music), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 643 (1892). See also Teleprompter Corp. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (holding that cable television retransmissions of 
copyrighted television broadcasts without copyright holders’ permission did not constitute a public 
performance of those works and was thus not an infringement); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398–401 (1968) (holding that a cable television provider’s transmission 
of copyrighted motion pictures without a license did not constitute a public performance within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act). Likewise, Congress may step in and tailor an exemption or compulsory 
license related to a new technology, as was the case with cable retransmission of broadcast television 
programs. See 17 U.S.C. § 111; Wu, supra note 134, at 322–23.  
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harbors;368 (3) compulsory licenses related to technologies;369 (4) the basic 
standards of liability, including Grokster’s active inducement claim;370 and 
(5) customs and industry practices for many technologies that are never 
tested in court.371 
Further study should be devoted to analyzing how these different 
components relate and how they might be revised or tailored to provide a 
more overarching and systematic approach to the difficult issues raised by 
speech technologies and their continual intersection with copyright law. 
For example, I would characterize (1) and (2) above as examples of quasi-
technological fair use in which the results reached were equivalent to a 
finding of fair use, thus allowing the technology in question to continue.372 
Future research should examine these cases for a more complete picture of 
copyright’s treatment of speech technologies. 
C.  INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
Another major challenge for technological fair use is international: 
how can technological fair use operate effectively in a global market, 
where technologies often have an international reach? While the United 
States recognizes an open-ended fair use doctrine, other countries typically 
rely on specific exemptions in their copyright acts.373 Thus, even if U.S. 
courts do recognize technological fair use, technology developers must still 
face the prospect that their speech technologies will not receive similar 
treatment in other countries. Of course, if the developer can easily divide 
up its market distribution by countries (choosing only to enter those 
markets with favorable copyright law), the legal problem is solved—
though consumers in other countries may suffer in being denied access to 
the speech technology. But, sometimes, market differentiation is difficult, if 
not impossible, especially for Internet applications.  
For example, although U.S. courts have recognized a fair use in the 
use of thumbnail photos for visual search engines, a German lower court 
ruled that such thumbnail photos constitute copyright infringement in 
 
 368. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; 17 U.S.C. § 512. See also supra note 231 and accompanying 
text. 
 369. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111. 
 370. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935–37. See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 
F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding no direct liability for Google’s inline linking or framing of 
copyrighted images stored on third-party servers under the “server” test). 
 371. See Lee, Warming Up, supra note 128, at 1476–79 (analyzing informal copyright practices). 
 372. See also supra note 231 and accompanying text.  
 373. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 293–
94 (2001). 
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Germany (which does not recognize fair use), a decision that was later 
overturned.374 Instead of fair use, the German Federal Court of Justice 
relied on implied consent (by website owners) to find Google image search 
did not violate German copyright law.375 Although the result in Germany 
eventually came out in favor of allowing image search technology, the case 
points to the lack of international consensus on determining exemptions to 
copyright. Likewise, even if GBS were recognized as a fair use in the 
United States, it too would likely face challenges in other countries—as is 
evident by the number of countries and foreign copyright holders that have 
objected to the proposed settlement.376 Indeed, a Paris court ruled recently 
(after the revised settlement had been struck in the U.S. case) that GBS 
violates French copyright law with respect to certain works of French 
origin.377 The international challenge of providing workable breathing 
room for speech technologies on a global scale is a topic that deserves far 
greater discussion than I can devote here. For present purposes at least, my 
theory of technological fair use is limited to recognition in the United 
States, where the tradition of the freedom of the press is strongest. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As the start of the twenty-first century has witnessed already the 
 
 374. The Regional Court of Hamburg found the use of thumbnail images in search indexes 
violates the German Copyright Act. See LG Hamburg, 9/26/2008, 308 O 42/06. Some German 
commentators have recognized the need to incorporate greater flexibility in statutory exemptions under 
German copyright law to deal with and allow new technologies. See, e.g., Matthias Leistner, The Role 
and Design of Limitations and the Need for Flexibility: Image Search on the Web as a Topical 
Example, in DOES ONE SIZE FIT ALL?, Proceedings of the ATRIP Congress 2008, EE, (A. Kur ed., 
forthcoming 2010). Eventually, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) 
overturned the lower court decision and ruled in favor of Google based on the notion that the website 
owner impliedly consented to allow her photographs to be used in Google image search. See BGH, I ZR 
69/08; Karin Matussek, Google Wins ‘Thumbnail’ Images Ruling in German Court (Update 2), 
BLOOMBERG, April 29, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-29/google-wins-thumbnail-
images-ruling-in-german-court-update2-.html. 
 375. See Matussek, supra note 374. 
 376. See, e.g., Sharon LaFraniere, In China, Objections to Google’s Book Scans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
31, 2009, at B4 (discussing objections by French and German governments, as well as by Chinese 
authors); Kelly Fiveash, Germany Says ‘Nein’ to Google Book Deal, REGISTER, Sept. 2, 2009, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/09/02/germany_opposes_google_books_settlement/ (discussing 
opposition from the German government); Honor Mahony, Europe’s Heated Reaction to Google Books, 
BUS. WK., Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/sep2009/gb2009099_ 
774179.htm (discussing the criticism from European publishers, booksellers, and authors to Google’s 
plan); Stanley Pignal, France to Oppose Google Book Scheme, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a38e5268-9bdd-11de-b214-00144feabdc0.html (discussing opposition by 
the French government). 
 377. Matthew Saltmarsh, Paris Court Orders Google to Stop Digitizing French Books and Pay 
Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, at B3. 
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emergence of many new and wondrous speech technologies, copyright law 
must be prepared to handle difficult questions posed by new technological 
uses of copyrighted works. This Article offers a framework intended to 
provide better guidance for courts in handling the difficult and complex 
analytical issues posed by technological fair use claims. Such guidance is 
needed because so much is at stake in these cases—not only the legality of 
a speech technology, but also potentially billions of dollars in growth to the 
U.S. economy and new technological innovations that can transform 
people’s lives. 
